Enabling civil society – time for cake and candles?

In July, the OECD Recommendation on Enabling Civil Society marked its fifth anniversary.

For those of you unfamiliar with the Recommendation, I wrote about it in an earlier blog for Bond. Here, I likened it to a movie sleeper hit: those under-the-radar films that attract a fan base with little or no promotion.

I was, and remain, one of those fans, though in truth the Recommendation didn’t receive the profile it deserved, so the fan base remains small.

As the Recommendation turns five, I was hoping this moment would be a celebration; a chance to mark just how much has changed as a result of this landmark commitment to civil society.

But before we bring out the cake and candles, here’s a quick recap of why the Recommendation matters.

A powerful commitment to civil society

The Recommendation is the first international standard focused on how government donors should act to support civil society. It covers three intersecting pillars:

1. Respecting, protecting and promoting civic space
2. Supporting and engaging with civil society
3. Incentivising CSO effectiveness, transparency and accountability 

These three pillars cover so much of what civil society has been advocating for over the past decade that it was remarkable to see it all in one document, endorsed by the world’s biggest providers of development assistance.

Five years on, it remains a powerful statement of commitment to civil society, and if you haven’t read it, I’d encourage you to.

How the OECD Recommendation has driven progress

So, what has been achieved since the Recommendation was launched in 2021?

First, the good news. According to the OECD’s five-year progress report published on 21^st September, there have been ‘real advances, in both policy and practice, towards enabling civil society. These efforts have helped embed civil society and civic space considerations more systematically within development co‑operation systems.’ For example, in new 2025 guidelines, Germany’s BMZoffers programme extensions up to five years, post-approval budget adjustments, and contingency funds. Critically, they cover up to 90% of operating costs (versus the standard 75%) for CSOs working in “closed” or “repressed” civic space, as defined by the CIVICUS Monitor, a CSO global civic space benchmarking tool. Meanwhile, in Global Affairs Canada (Canada’s FCDO equivalent) launched a Grants and Contributions Transformation Initiative in 2023 that ran a “Risk Appetite Hackathon” with 350+ CSOs and a “FailSmart Lab” to rethink risk.  

Other governments have improved their locally led funding practices in line with the Recommendation, including Australia, Denmark, Switzerland and Ireland. An even longer list of donors have reduced administrative burdens for their support to civil society. However, there is an important caveat. Some of the good practice cited in the report was in place before the OECD Recommendation. This isn’t to say that positive examples shouldn’t be celebrated. It’s just that if they pre-date the Recommendation, it may be a case of dressing up old news rather than highlighting actual changes the Recommendation inspired.   

Now for the bad news

While the UK is mentioned in the OECD’s report, the examples aren’t as widespread as in many other DAC members, and only one (the FCDO’s 2025 guidance on human rights defenders) was released after the Recommendation. Even if we were generous and argued they were still good initiatives, they don’t add up to a coherent approach to supporting civil society or protecting civic space.

For example, the report cites the FCDO/Comic Relief ‘Shifting the Power’ programme, launched in 2020, which is providing core grants to local organisations in three countries over ten years. This is no doubt a good initiative, but it remains siloed within the FCDO bureaucracy, where funding practices remain largely unchanged. As GAPS reported earlier this year, despite emphasising local leadership, the FCDO “continues to rely heavily on existing multilateral mechanisms and established international partners”, and civil society organisations “are often required to navigate significant compliance, reporting and administrative requirements, which can limit their flexibility and responsiveness”.

And we can’t ignore the massive cuts to ODA, with the UK set to register the steepest cut to its aid budget of any G7 country between 2024 and 2026, according to Bond’s own analysis. Looking at specific FCDO departments, Bond’s recent blog shows that the new Human Development Directorate, where civil society now sits, faces a 52% cut in 2026/27.

Of course, the quantity of funding is not the sole measure of any government’s commitment to civil society, and the OECD Recommendation does not refer to the amount of funding DAC members should set aside. But it is difficult to provide financial support to a diverse range of actors (part of Pillar 2) when the funding envelope has collapsed so spectacularly. In fact, CSOs consulted in the drafting of the OECD report argued that the “do no harm” principle should extend to funding decisions, particularly cuts and exits, a point that came out strongly in Peace Direct’s recent publication ‘From Aid to Solidarity’.

Sadly, the overall assessment from the OECD for all DAC countries under review is that ‘a persistent gap remains between policy commitments and implementation, driven by declining ODA budgets, shifting political priorities, an increasingly restrictive environment for civic space and continued structural barriers limiting effective engagement and collaboration with CSOs.’ Five years in, and the overall message appears to be MUST DO BETTER.

How the FCDO can better implement the Recommendation and champion civil society

With such underwhelming progress to date, what should we expect from the FCDO in the coming years? Despite the gloomy picture, there are reasons to cling to some hope. First, the new Foreign Secretary appears keen to restore the UK’s international standing, and there are rumours that this might mean a less austere ODA budget in the future. Second, the internal restructuring at FCDO is finally settling down, and while this must have been hugely bruising for anyone inside the beast, stability even at a smaller scale is far better than endless restructures.

For Bond and its members, I hope that this means more consistent engagement with FCDO officials than we’ve had in the past year or two. And finally, the FCDO’s recent endorsement of the Call to Action on Locally Led Development, coordinated by Peace Direct, suggests a renewed commitment to changing how it supports civil society organisations in the Global South. This suggests the political will remains, even if it is operating in a more constrained environment.

So where should the FCDO start? Here are some suggestions:

• Align. Ensure that the recently announced civil society fund is structured around the OECD Recommendation’s three pillars.
• Coordinate & Integrate. Identify a focal point for work on the Recommendation who has sufficient authority to ensure proper coordination of effort across FCDO, including cross-team leads to ensure consistent implementation.
• Consult. Establish a consultative forum between the FCDO and CSOs (both Global North and South) to ensure the FCDO benefits from CSO input in implementing the Recommendation. The expertise already exists among CSOs. The FCDO just needs to ask.
• Report. Commit to reporting on progress annually. And don’t be afraid to share failures and challenges. Transparency builds trust.

Finally, the FCDO must retire many existing policies and entrenched practices that favour the largest INGOs at the expense of genuine diversity among CSO partners. In doing so, the FCDO will become a better champion of civil society at a time when it is most needed.