ENOUGH FOOD FOR EVERYONE IF: CAMPAIGN EVALUATION

Steve Tibbett and Chris Stalker (The Advocacy Hub)
Commissioned by the Enough Food for Everyone IF campaign
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This report is the main output of an independent evaluation which was commissioned by the IF campaign and conducted by two independent consultants, Steve Tibbett and Chris Stalker.

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The authors were helped by Martin Clark, a consultant who undertook some interviews and commented on drafts.
The Enough Food for Everyone IF campaign (referred to in this report as the ‘IF campaign’) was launched in January 2013 and was an attempt to make progress towards ending global hunger. It was designed around three ‘key moments’: the campaign launch, the UK government budget and the G8 summit. These key moments were defined by campaigning activities - both online and offline - reaching a climax in June in the run up to the G8.

The IF campaign’s main policy asks as outlined by its launch report covered four main policy ‘baskets’: tax, transparency, aid and land, aimed at the UK government, and its chairship of the G8. The campaign operated UK-wide, with distinct campaigns in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales. Undertaken during a time of economic austerity and waning interest in and support for development issues, it was an attempt to shore up the development sector’s influence, protect political support for international development and revitalise the sector’s activist and campaigns’ supporter base, as well as achieve policy change in key areas.

The campaign achieved key areas of policy progress and a high level of political access, as well as increased campaigning capacity in the sector. It helpfully built on a number of key learnings from other campaigns as well as drawing on the considerable expertise of coalition members and their staff.

In particular, the campaign was good at adapting to changing policy and political opportunities including allowing an increase in ambition in the measures of success set for policy change in key areas (for example the changing context on the tax agenda). The campaign also had a well-connected, targeted, and expert lobbying arm which has set high standards for coalition lobbying. It was adept at times at capturing the synergies between strategic media, policy and advocacy work. The sector’s excellent assets in the form of political and media contacts were harnessed by IF to good effect and the campaign had a strong commitment to innovation and the testing of new strategies and activities, particularly on the digital side.

This report must be read with this context in mind and the relative success of key aspects of the campaign should be held against the difficult external context.

Outcomes and progress
The overall assessment of the outcomes of the campaign is broadly positive. Many objectives have been met, there has been progress on others and others have been missed.

Policy and political
The policy outcomes of the campaign, compared to the measures of success set, were very good overall, especially on tax, but also on nutrition funding pledges and aid commitments. Policy advances on tax are described as excellent, especially the commitments on the OECD Convention and UK government commitments. Many of these outcomes far exceeded initial expectations.

The Nutrition for Growth summit secured commitments of US$500 million a year between 2013 and 2020 to tackle malnutrition, producing a headline figure of US$4.15 billion. The level of pledges is widely viewed as very positive. However the expansion of the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition was considered by some to be a retrograde step.

Securing a continued commitment by the UK government in the budget to spending 0.7% of gross national income on aid is a key success of the campaign, and a prominent policy outcome. This outcome was tempered by the lack of legislation to enshrine a commitment to future spending at that level.

It seems that ‘land’ was overall a less notable area of policy progress. However there is a view that the campaign has laid the groundwork for future action on land and biofuels. There is some evidence that reasonable progress was also made on UK government commitments to increased transparency. On climate finance there was little progress beyond the reiteration of previous commitments.

Politically, the campaign can be seen as comparatively successful in the sense that it has raised international development issues up the UK government agenda for the period of the campaign and managed to capture a significant portion of the G8 agenda, as well as significant political and media attention in the run up to the G8.
Progress in a number of areas can show a meaningful contribution from the IF campaign. In particular, the nutrition and tax elements of the campaign outcomes show strong levels of contribution. In some areas, the extent of the campaign’s contribution is questioned by some assessments both inside and outside the campaign.

Mobilisation
In areas related to supporter and public mobilisation, and public understanding of the structural causes of poverty and hunger, the overall assessment is less positive. The campaign did not achieve many of the mobilisation targets it set itself, although arguably, some of these were unrealistic from the start and made more difficult because of the short timelines.

The campaign operated in a linked but separate way in the nations - Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland - where campaigns supported the main UK campaign calls. These national campaigns developed their own identity and momentum and there are specific outcomes that can be attributed to them, or to which they have contributed.

Media coverage
The campaign had good levels of media coverage, particularly around and in the run up to the G8. Of IF media coverage, 90% was either favourable or emphatically favourable in sentiment. Policy change underpinned 69% of the coverage. In total there were 3,325 separate pieces of coverage.

Sector capacity
The campaign has helped re-energise the development sector’s existing campaigner-activist base, and has increased campaigns capacity more generally. There is also a strong indication that, in a professional sense, sectoral capacity has significantly increased.

The campaign model and process of formation hasn’t helped sector trust as whole but trust between some organisations is markedly higher than before the campaign and overall the analysis is that although progress on trust levels is variable, on balance there is an improvement.

Indicators of increased depth of support in the sector showed progress. These included: the number of people taking multiple online actions throughout the campaign; organisations reporting an increase in the depth of support of their campaigners throughout the IF campaign and organisations reporting increased capacity to campaign on any issue.

Public understanding
According to opinion polling conducted on behalf of IF, the campaign did not bring about the changes it sought in the UK public’s understanding of the structural causes of hunger. However the campaign highlighted the issue of tax which has led to improved recognition amongst the media and politicians about a key structural cause of hunger.

Objectives and purpose
IF campaign coalition members identified a number of the campaign’s important purposes and goals, of which protecting the political space for international development was vital for many. Overall (and this is understandable given the range of organisations involved and their expectations) there wasn’t an agreed overarching theory of change for the campaign.

The key agreed objectives of the IF campaign centred on specific policy progress and building massive public support for action. The specific objectives and success measures set on mass mobilisation and increased public awareness and public engagement were highly ambitious.

The policy baskets of the campaign were technically of a high quality and content and over time as the political opportunity grew the policy asks evolved upwards in ambition. However the policy platform was somewhat complex and disjointed, which was sometimes challenging in terms of messaging and communications. The Scottish and Welsh wings of the campaign had additional specific policy asks aimed at their legislatures.

Effectiveness of strategies and tactics
The campaign employed a skilful mix of media stunts, lobbying and digital tactics, plus a significant mobilisation, to produce an appearance of mass mobilisation that helped enable access to and action by government. The campaign retained the mobilisation threat of previous campaigns and most accept that it did enough to protect the sector’s position as one of the UK’s top campaign mobilisers. However the lack of mobilisation on the scale of previous coalition campaign efforts is acknowledged as a risk going forward.

The campaign employed a ‘loose-tight’ strategy. The three main moments involved tightly controlled activities with looser periods in-between filled with organisations adding their own activity to keep up momentum. In the main, this didn’t work as well as expected.
In terms of the brand, the campaign name was not popular either inside or outside the campaign, although neither was it universally unpopular. The look-and-feel design elements of the brand received a more mixed reception. One reason that the brand struggled was because the policy platform and hunger overlay were complex to get across. The limited marketing budget also contributed to this.

The success of the campaign’s stunts is a key area of achievement. The Big IF rally in London was recognised as a crucially important moment of public engagement and mobilisation in support of the campaign. The event was in keeping with the rest of the campaign in terms of numbers of supporters engaged, lower than some previous campaigns, but understandable in the context. The ‘elephant in the room’ stunt was felt to be effective in the sense that it had been noticed by senior figures in the government.

The lobbying element of IF is another area that comes in for widespread praise, both internally and externally. From government, there was a strong sense of technical competence from the campaign lobbying outfit. A core group within the large Policy and Advocacy Working Group worked very effectively together. In terms of positioning, the ‘insider’ political strategy employed was generally supported, although closeness to government was questioned by a minority. The IF campaign had a good profile and reasonably wide-ranging support in parliament.

The media group managed collectively to attain lots of - almost exclusively positive - coverage for the campaign and its aims. There is also evidence of good and strengthened relationships with some journalists. Despite these successes there were some frustrations in terms of disconnection between media work, the overall strategy and the Organising Committee (OC).

The digital work generated a significant volume of engagement. Overall traffic analysis measured 2.25 million views of pages on the IF website, with social media exposure calculated at 165,718 mentions of IF, and a total of over 3.4 million interactions with IF across all social media channels. Overall, the digital work within the sector was innovative, well respected and was noticed by some external opinion formers. However there were issues with wider engagement and the extent to which this strategy ‘broke through’ and reached a wider audience.

Much of the IF offline supporter mobilisation could be attributed to the efforts of the faith organisations. The Faith Working Group was, in this sense, a good example of devolving decision-making authority and releasing creative energy which has built trust. The Schools and Youth Working Group was another good example of successful devolved decision-making.

There were a number of key successes with engaging celebrities who drove much of the social and traditional media coverage. However the coalition had arguably underestimated the growing competition amongst charities for celebrity endorsement and the campaign messages were complex and difficult to break down into manageable calls for support. Other areas that had challenges included the private sector strategy which suffered from a lack of agreed approach from the beginning at senior levels in the coalition and the ‘lifestyle’ campaign actions which came late and didn’t in the end make up a key part of the campaign.

**Structure, organisation and management**

The structure of the IF campaign worked reasonably well in general terms, delivering a major workload in a complex environment and for an ambitious campaign. However the structure was also widely thought to be highly complex, too vertically oriented and to lack clarity of process at times on sign-off, decision-making and leadership.

The Board in general terms was found to have worked well and was useful for internal organisational commitment and alignment among key members of the coalition. The OC was relatively healthy as a decision-making forum and had mainly good functional working relationships; however it was strained at times by differences, mainly on policy aspects and sometimes on political strategy.

Although the OC was experienced and skilled in key areas, it was chosen according to organisational representation and, overall, members had a relative lack of communications expertise, digital and media capability and understanding of mass public campaigning, branding and advertising processes.
The campaigns in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales - were up and running soon after the campaign plans were announced. The campaign facilitated the nations moderately well, partly through budget allocations and partly through allowing a degree of flexibility in terms of messaging, communications and policy asks, especially later on in the campaign. Representatives of the nations were not formal members of the OC although they did engage with the group. The central campaign could have done more to include the nations in decision-making and by providing or allowing a range of bespoke materials.

The wider coalition (those organisations that did not have staff chairing working groups or in other decision-making positions) were mainly positive about their involvement in the campaign. However, they generally felt that their experience of the campaign would have been improved by more opportunities to feed into and understand key campaign decisions. The assembly meetings (regular meetings that all coalition members were invited to) were described as useful, well-timed and well-organised, but lacking in opportunities to feed into decision-making.

In terms of planning, most elements were delivered on time despite, significant pressures of time and working in a large coalition. However, plans suffered from not being fully and widely understood by the wider coalition at key times. This was in part reportedly because of a lack of information flow but also because some decisions and plans were delayed or re-considered.

In general internal communication about campaign activities was reasonably good; however some felt there was a lack of information at a strategic level, particularly from the OC. At the end of the campaign, a process was set up for supporters to sign up to continue campaigning with one of the campaign’s many member organisations. Technically, the mechanism worked well but many felt that there was too long a gap between the activity around the G8 and the follow-up process.

**Resource availability, allocation and value for money**

The financial input by donors and coalition members along with in-kind contributions has led to a number of important outcomes both in terms of funding and policy changes. These include over $4 billion of global nutrition funding commitments, the realisation of the commitment to spend 0.7% of UK gross national income on international development and policies endorsed by the UK government and the G8 that increase the overall likelihood of more available resources for international development.

While these commitments can’t be entirely attributed to the IF campaign, many of the commitments are unlikely to have happened as quickly, robustly or publically without the IF campaign advocacy and associated public pressure. This therefore indicates a high-level of return on investment and represents good value for money.

**Lessons and recommendations for future coalition campaigns**

• Coalition strategy should be informed by power analysis and exploration of common and competing theories of change.

• Campaigns’ policy asks should follow political opportunity and be further informed by communication needs.

• The structure and management model of future coalition campaigns should balance empowerment and control, reflect expertise and diversity, and facilitate action.

• Campaigns should seek to ensure a holistic and integrated view of communications, strongly linked to purpose and change objectives.

A full list of recommendations is provided at the end of this report in section 4.

**SUMMARY**
EVALUATION PARAMETERS, STRUCTURE & ORGANISATION
Background to the evaluation

This evaluation is a planned part of a suite of wider work on monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL). It was led by the MEL Working Group which is integrated into the IF campaign and the coalition structure, and led by Bond. The MEL work predates the campaign launch and has a number of scheduled interventions and outputs, of which this report is a central focus.

The evaluation process is split into three parts:

1. Production of the main evaluation of the campaign (of which this report is the key output).
2. Presenting the learnings from the evaluation to the sector.
3. Planning for and production of a broader package of resources to help embed learning in the sector.

Objectives

The key objectives for the project were:

- to assess the extent to which the campaign has achieved its objectives
- to assess changes that can be attributed to the campaign and changes that were contributed to by the campaign
- to assess coalition ways of working and identify lessons for future coalition campaign efforts
- to assess the strategic effectiveness of the campaign and identify lessons for the future and consider the campaign’s value for money

Scope

Following on from the purpose and objectives the evaluation’s approach is both a summative and formative (see below).

Given the number of existing MEL processes already in place, the evaluation seeks to be overarching and holistic, but also complementary to existing processes and to incorporate and draw on the other monitoring and evaluation data. The campaign set itself a number of measures of success, which the evaluation has used as a guide in assessing the campaign’s attainments.

All comments were gathered on a non-attributable basis in order to encourage people to contribute their views with maximum candour. For this reason, we have preserved the anonymity of the interviewees (as is good practice in evaluations of this type).

The method of selection of interviewees is partly a qualitative one. The selection was a collaborative process, between the MEL Working Group, the OC and the consultant team. The consultants prepared a set of selection criteria for guiding this process, attempting a balance between the research criteria for guiding this process, attempting a balance between the research effectiveness of data quality and the principle of participation.

Approach and methodology

In formative evaluations, campaigns are typically assessed during their development or implementation to provide information about how best to revise and modify for improvement. For this evaluation this was done primarily by ‘accompanying’ the planning and implementation processes in order to observe coalition dynamics, campaign culture and decision-making processes.

Interviews

A number of methods and tools were used in the evaluation. The ‘mainstay’ of the qualitative research approach was the semi-structured interview. This was used with all of types of stakeholders, both internal and external to the campaign.

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Focus group discussions

Another key method of creating the evidence base was through four focus group discussions. Participants were selected on the basis of their particular knowledge areas of the campaign. The attendance of the focus groups varied from three to seven, with a total of 18 participants. The four groups were defined as follows:

- The nations (Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland)
- Working group chairs (those not already on the interview list were invited)
- ‘Key moments’ (people who were closely involved in planning and delivering the ‘key moments’ of the campaign)
- Working group chairs (those not already on the interview list were invited)

Accompaniment

The purpose of the accompanied element of the evaluation is that it allows the evaluators to experience and deepen their understanding of the campaign in ‘real time’ and first hand, rather than just retrospectively, through interviews and monitoring data etc. The evaluation team attended and observed some key strategic and delivery meetings over the final stages of the campaign, such as the meetings of the OC, the assembly, the Policy and Advocacy Working Group, the Media Working Group and the Board.

Additional data sources

In addition to the data sets created by the evaluation, the evaluation draws on additional evidence from inside and outside the campaign. These sources include the following categories:

- The campaign monitoring data
- IF surveys covering both the member organisations of the coalition and campaign activists
- Other informal and internal evaluations and reviews, such as those done by working groups
- External evaluations like the external media evaluation
- Tracking research into public opinion trends on public perceptions of poverty and hunger, in partnership with Research Now, led by Oxfam GB
- Research and analysis led by David Hudson at University College London on (a) social media and (b) network dynamics
- Strategies, reports and online elements of the campaign were also assessed and fed into the data collection and analysis

Management of the evaluation

The independent evaluation team (consisting of Chris Stalker and Steve Tibbett from the Advocacy Hub) managed and carried out the key evaluation tasks. They were assisted on data collection by another consultant: Martin Clark. The evaluation team was managed by Bond, and the work was overseen by the MEL Working Group/OC committee (consisting of the Campaign’s MEL Working Group plus select members of the OC), endorsed by the Board and overseen by the OC.
EVALUATION PARAMETERS, STRUCTURE & ORGANISATION

This report

Report structure

The report is structured as follows:

**Section 1. Evaluation, parameters, structure and organisation**
- Background
- Purpose, objectives and scope
- Approach and methodology
- Management of the evaluation

**Section 2. Introduction**
- Campaign background and context

**Section 3. Findings and analysis**
- Purpose and objectives
- Outcomes and achievements assessed
- Strategies and tactics
- Structure, organisation and management
- Other aspects

**Section 4. Lessons and recommendations**
- Some learnings and lessons to repeat
- Policy and strategy
- Structure and management
- Mobilisation messaging and communications

Narrative data presentation

Data in this report comes from a wide variety of sources, as noted above. All assertions made are derived from this data which has been generated either by the evaluation team, other external evaluations and reports (in the form of academic studies or consultancies employed by the campaign), or internal data (in the form of informal evaluations, survey and other monitoring data) produced by the campaign itself and its member organisations.

The quotations used come from a mixture of interviewees, focus groups and other evaluations.

The term ‘internal’ (or insider) is used to describe interviewees from either focus groups or interviews. The term ‘external’ is used to categorise interviewees who were not formally part of the campaign.

When a particular view is expressed in the form of a quotation, this is because it represents either a majority view, or a significant view that illustrates a sufficiently representative view. Occasionally quotations are used to illustrate minority views. Where this is the case, it is noted as such.

Limitations

The data collected for the campaign is highly complex and reflects the breadth and depth of the IF campaign, the monitoring thereof and other data it has generated. That said, the data collection was constrained by a relatively limited number of external decision-maker (government) inputs available to the evaluation.
“From government, there was a strong sense of technical competence from the campaign lobbying outfit.”
INTRODUCTION

100 school children hand in their IF messages to David Cameron. London, June 2013.

Credit: Mikael Buck for UNICEF
INTRODUCTION

2.1. Campaign background and basics

**Genesis and establishment**

Major international development organisations had, over a number of years, discussed forming a new major coalition. This would follow on from other major coalitions such as Make Poverty History and Jubilee 2000, but with different emphasis and framing. One influence was a paper published in 2011 that had encouraged, and outlined options for, future sector campaigning. Informal discussions first started in mid-2011 between the five BOAG agencies. Food and hunger was the frontrunner for the campaign's messaging and its policy agenda. Part of the conversation at the initial stage was about the intention to focus the campaign around an attempt to fundamentally 'reframe' the public discourse on - and understanding of - the 'structural causes' of poverty.

The period of BOAG negotiations were (as described in the Formation Evaluation) viewed by many as protracted, but by the end of 2011 the subject matter was mostly agreed and the policy platform of aid, tax and land - as well as the key target of the UK chairing of the G8 - was largely decided. The discussion widened out to other groups - Bond, ONE, Comic Relief, Tearfund, Friends of the Earth, RSPB and WWF-UK (although the last three eventually decided not to join the campaign because there was not a strong enough fit in terms of the policy platform and the framing of the campaign from a communications point of view) and then to wider civil society. This wider coalition-building process took quite a long time.

In April 2012, the first campaign assembly took place with a wide group of invited participants. In total 112 participants registered to attend from 76 organisations. The next months were taken up with the development of working groups and policy details. IF campaigns were also organised in the nations: Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales.

**Campaign activities and structure**

The Enough Food for Everyone IF campaign was launched on 23 January 2013 and was designed around three 'key moments': the launch, the budget (on 20 March 2013) and the G8 (on 17-18 June 2013). These key moments were defined by campaigning activities – both online and offline - reaching a climax in June in the run up to the G8. A fourth moment was planned in the autumn but not specified, and was later dropped (for reasons which are returned to later in this report).

**Campaign objectives:**
- Specific policy progress to achieve a sustainable food system and tackle hunger
- To build massive public support for action to achieve these goals by deepening understanding of poverty and development, the environment, and the need for structural change

Policy change objectives were structured around four key ‘baskets’ or areas:
- **Basket 1. Investment** (aid and climate finance): By meeting existing promises, provide more and better finance for sustainable small-scale agriculture and child nutrition
- **Basket 2. Land:** Ensuring fair and sustainable use of land so it contributes to food security, and growth and development which benefits poor people
- **Basket 3. Tax:** Enabling poor countries to raise revenue to invest in tackling hunger and food insecurity
- **Basket 4. Transparency:** Improving transparency to ensure the use of land and natural resources benefits poor people and support sustainable, equitable growth. Helping ensure citizens in developing countries can hold their governments to account for use of revenues through increased fiscal transparency

The coalition was structured around a central Organising Committee (the OC) reporting to a Board, and responsible for a number of working groups which in turn were tasked with delivering the key elements of the campaign. The campaign was underpinned by the IF assembly for members of the coalition which allowed wider dissemination and discussion. The campaign organogram is shown in Annex 3.
INTRODUCTION

2.2 Campaign context

External context

The IF campaign in the UK was undertaken during a time of economic austerity and a reported waning of public interest in - and political support for – international development issues. In addition, many parts of the media had become more sceptical (and sometimes critical) of the international development agenda, and specifically about levels of government spending on aid and the efficacy of this spending.15 In turn, the public has become markedly more sceptical of both aid, and of politics and politicians.

Partly as a consequence of this, there was also a general perception in the sector that there was less interest in parliament and across government. Although they had at senior levels confirmed their commitment to international development and in particular aid, the Coalition government - and especially the Conservatives who were in charge of key areas of government - were not, historically, renowned for their prioritisation of the issue. The campaign context was sometimes held in comparison to that of the Make Poverty History campaign and Jubilee 2000, both of which operated at a time when those at the top of the then Labour government were perceived as more wholeheartedly committed to international development.

This report must be read with this context in mind and the relative success of key aspects of the campaign should be held against the difficult external context.

The campaign coalition had been aware of these constraints and challenges. However some aspects of the political environment seemed more favourable, at least in the short term. Early discussions with government revealed the Prime Minister was looking for issues on which to hang the G8 agenda, to bolster a public image of supporting international development and demonstrate international leadership. David Cameron’s Davos speech on 24 January 2013 revealed his interest in making the ‘three T’s’ of transparency, tax and trade the focus of his chairship of the G8. In particular he signalled his willingness to make tax a key issue: “We want to use the G8 to drive a more serious debate on tax evasion and tax avoidance.”16 Media debates on tax, led by many civil society groups, trade unions, parliamentarians and activists - including some of those involved in the IF campaign - had also grown both before and during the period of the campaign which meant that the political context on tax had become more amenable. Aid, and in particular nutrition funding, to which the Prime Minister had an established commitment, was also indicated as an area in which progress could be made.

Sector context

Allied to this external context, in recent years the NGO sector has arguably been less revered as a campaigning force for change than it had been in the early 2000s. This was partly as a consequence of the external environment but also because the sector has seen a splintering of issue selection and divergent models of change emerging, as well as an increase in more accessible technologically-driven models of campaigning.17 The sector’s advocacy abilities have also been hit by falling income in the current economic climate. Finally, the previous challenges of joint campaigning had also, for some, been a hindrance to further collaboration.

Rapidly growing online-based campaigns groups such as Avaaz, change.org and 38 degrees, as well as less formally structured, radical campaigning movements such as UK Uncut and Occupy have come forward to challenge the campaigning orthodoxy.18 Finding Frames19 a project initiated by Oxfam, and supported by DFID, sought to find ways to transform both the way that the UK public think about international development, and also about the values that underpin the way NGOs frame their public interventions and campaign messages.

This internal context made coming together as a campaign coalition more likely to be laboured and protracted. The fact that the difficulties were overcome is an indication of the efforts of the campaign’s architects and key protagonists.

Credit: Julius Honnor/Bond

FINDINGS & ANALYSIS
3.1. Campaign purpose and objectives

This section examines the overall purpose and specific objectives of the campaign by looking at the level of agreement, hierarchy, achievability and consistency of objectives.

Members of the IF campaign coalition identified a number of important purposes and goals for the campaign. For many, protecting the political space for international development was a key purpose. Overall, and understandably given the range of organisations and consequent expectations involved, there wasn't an agreed overarching theory of change for the campaign.

**Purpose**

The IF campaign had a number of key purposes, overall goals and objectives, outlined in several documents and strategies, but also elucidated by key actors in the campaign. It is possible to discern at least five purposes that were held by coalition members:

- To achieve policy change on aid, tax, transparency and land
- To let the government - and other key actors such as the media - recognise that the sector is 'still here' and remains muscular, in order in particular to protect the international development space in general, and the aid budget in particular, against attacks, and also to maintain commitment from government for 0.7% of national income to be spent on aid
- To revitalise and reinvigorate the sector's activist and campaigns supporter base
- To work together as a sector and revitalise the professional campaigning capacity of the sector
- To reframe the public/media narrative on poverty and hunger in order to reframe the debate

In reality these purposes were – to varying degrees - all important to different actors within the coalition and for some more than one was fundamental. Staff changes within organisations also led to a further variance of views about the purpose. For many, particularly those located centrally in the larger organisations, however, the purpose around protecting the space for international development was - or least became - the key purpose of the campaign.20

"There was a lot of political division and media attacks on international development so coming together was important", said one insider.

For another:

"[The purpose was to] make sure that development remained part of the public and political agenda [as the] context posed many risks. It was about putting development at the top of the agenda. The context wouldn’t have naturally allowed this and we had to try and engage people".

In general, there was wide agreement on many of the elements of the purpose but not the balance or hierarchy of purpose, nor a sufficiently shared analysis of the implications and risks of the lack of these. The lack of clarity of purpose, at the beginning and throughout the campaign would come to have an impact on - and somewhat delay - the management and execution of the campaign, though not to the extent of compromising key policy gains. One external informant said: "The negotiations [to get the policy baskets agreed] were a necessary evil to get the agreement to work together".

Importantly, although public mobilisation at scale in order to demonstrate public concern for development was a core objective of the campaign, it was not widely described internally as a core purpose.

One crucial consequence (and cause) of this lack of common purpose was that there wasn’t an agreed overarching theory of how change could happen. It seems that different member organisations, and the people within them, had different ideas, expectations and analyses about, for example, the extent to which supporter mobilisation and public engagement might influence the policy and political process. As one key external interviewee reflected "There was not strategic alignment on how change happens. The policy sweep brought the coalition together... It was not led by analysis about what will bring change".

However, this lack of alignment is notable in other large scale coalitions and understandable in the context of over 200 organisations with different backgrounds and views of how change happens and may also be seen in a positive light in terms of bringing together different views toward the same policy end.
In addition, for some, the key purpose was to educate and inform the UK public about the structural causes of poverty, through an ambitious reframing of the debate (as discussed above). However most agree this was not in the end the key purpose. Nevertheless, it remained a key objective for some in the form of ensuring the existence of the policy debates and interventions on tax, land, and for some climate finance. In this sense the ‘structural causes’ purpose became, de facto, less about educating the wider public and reframing the debate per se, and more about ensuring that the campaign remained more than one aimed at increasing development finance in various ways. This is understandable, but on reflection may have contributed to weakening the focus. The issue of ‘public understanding of structural causes of hunger’ was tracked in a robust series of opinion poll research surveys undertaken by Oxfam in partnership with Research Now, the results of which are further discussed below. Some externals were particularly keen to point to the lack of re-framing ambition in the campaign compared to the way they had understood it would present itself. One external civil society campaigner noted that “the ‘Frames’ stuff seemed to be nowhere... an austerity framing would have been good... it would have been better to connect south and north poverty”. However some internals made the counter point that the structural causes elements were a strong strand of the campaign, particularly in the form of the centrality of the work on tax.

Objectives and outcomes sought
The main ‘core’ objectives of this campaign as outlined in the Joint Campaign 2013 Measures of Success April 2013 were:

• Specific policy progress to achieve a sustainable food system and tackle hunger
• To build massive public support for action to achieve these goals by deepening understanding of poverty and development, the environment, and the need for structural change

The same document also outlines the key measures of success. The main elements of this were that:

• Policy aims were achieved
• Support for international development and the environment increased among the UK public
• A better understanding was reached among a sector of the public of the structural causes of food insecurity and hunger and of the impacts on the natural world caused by food production and consumption
• The UK public is mobilised and engaged
• The sector and movement is strengthened with improved new capabilities to work post campaign
• Global support for campaign aims achieved

In addition to these indicators, some Working Groups and individual events and ‘moments’ had their own individual key performance indicators.

Hierarchy of and levels of agreement on objectives
In general, amongst interviewees these objectives were in large part agreed by interviewees to be important and relevant campaign objectives, given the evolving external agenda. Most respondents, certainly at a senior level, gave support to the two ‘core’ objectives. However among these and other objectives outlined in the measures of success there wasn’t an apparent hierarchy of objectives. Objectives were often pursued so that different interests could coexist in order to ensure a broad coalition and functional working relationships, especially among the larger agencies.

The operational activation of a hierarchy was also shaped by the external environment, for instance, “The way the media focused on tax made it hard to talk about anything else [in the end]. It wasn’t in our control”. 
The policy ‘baskets’

The stated main policy asks of the campaign, as outlined by the campaign’s launch report\(^2\) covered four main policy ‘baskets’ aimed at the UK government, and its chairship of the G8. These were described as follows:

- **Funding to tackle nutrition and hunger**, including by investing in small-scale farmers, nutrition and climate adaptation, through commitments in these areas at the G8 but also, crucially for the campaign, by the UK meeting its commitments to spend 0.7% of gross national income on aid by 2013, and to legally enshrine this commitment.

- **Enabling countries to raise tax revenue to tackle hunger** by changing UK rules on tax and by the G8 increasing international tax transparency.

- **Ensuring the fair and sustainable use of land** by improving governance of large-scale land acquisitions and ending support for damaging biofuels policies.

- **Leading the world to be more transparent about tackling hunger** by strengthening corporate accountability requirements, improving governance, transparency and accountability in land agreements, and increasing budget transparency in support of Open Government Partnership.\(^2\)

De facto, the campaign internal and external communications tended to shorten these policy areas to “aid, land, tax and transparency”. In reality however, the campaign prioritised specific policies around tax, nutrition funding and 0.7% as key areas that were seen as having support both within the coalition and in areas where there was adequate political opportunity to make progress.

Scottish and Welsh asks

The Scottish wing of the campaign had five Scottish-specific policy asks which, broadly, shadowed the UK campaign’s policy baskets. These were:

- **The Climate Justice Fund should match the International Development Fund by 2016.**

- **Procurement legislation should include fair trade, tax and environmental criteria.**

- **The Scottish government should host a Global Land Hearing to discuss lessons from Scotland which could inform the implementation of the 2012 Voluntary Guidelines on land tenure.**

- **There should be greater investment for Global Citizenship Education.**

- **Transparent annual reporting should capture Scotland’s impact on developing countries with the Scottish government delivering a more coordinated response.**

Scottish and Welsh asks

There were also a series of Wales-specific policy objectives.\(^2\) That the Welsh government:

- **Can help tackle global hunger by maintaining its support for the Wales for Africa programme and by introducing a strong and binding Sustainable Development Bill that will commit Wales to seriously fight climate change.**

- **Should ensure that it supports fair trade, tax transparency and environmental sustainability and that these principles are at the heart of public procurement decisions. Private companies, charities, community groups and individuals in Wales should scrutinise what they buy and how they buy, to help protect the world’s poorest people.**

- **Help protect land rights and improve the food security of people in developing countries and enshrine these objectives in the Wales for Africa programme, and the Wales Food Strategy.**

- **Press for the abolition of the EU’s de facto biofuels mandate, and ensure that the true scale of carbon emissions associated with biofuels is accounted for in its measurement of Wales’ ecological footprint.**

- **Renew commitment to Education for Sustainable Development and Global Citizenship.**

- **Welsh MEPs to press for the abolition of the EU’s de facto biofuels mandate, which is driving up food prices, causing land grabs, and harming the environment.**
Coherence of the policy baskets (areas)

There is a strong and near-unanimous finding that the policy baskets of the campaign – while technically of a high quality and content - were too complex, disjointed and too plentiful. This was a challenge not only in terms of messaging and communications for public mobilisation, but also for the media, social media and communications in general. This complexity presented a challenge for briefing journalists, creative agencies and most supporter-facing communications.

Although the policy baskets were challenging, there is a sense that this was logical and understandable given the lack of a unifying common narrative and a focused agenda: “Policy baskets were retro-fitted into the campaign. They were good policy objectives, but didn’t go together. They were needed for the coming together of BOAGs, so [in that sense] they were pragmatic”, said one internal. This is further witnessed by comments in February 2013 when the campaign was discussed at the assembly meeting, where there were mixed feelings about the number of policies: “People also have concerns about the policy asks. Some feel that there is too much in the mix, and others feel that there are still some asks missing...”23 There was also a feeling that some of the policy platforms didn’t fit that well with the campaign’s G8 focus and that they weren’t designed or chosen on that basis. One explanation is that they were partly set as a way to resolve the question of prioritising different coalition aims and were intended to force the coalition to think beyond what policy changes were or could be aimed mainly at the G8.

A related issue is that the policy platform was not sufficiently coherent with the core hunger message and campaign overlay. The campaign message was about hunger but the policy mix included issues that didn’t easily correspond with that. One internal expression of this was: “Hunger wouldn’t naturally focus on tax. Roads, access to market, finance, seeds, yes... we were kind of fudging it.” Many external views echoed this.

Achievability

Overall, the ambition of objectives was set high for a campaign that was always planned to be a short-term intensive burst of energy, capacity, resources and action. This matched the scale of ambition of the key partners and the hope to build on the success of previous large scale coalition campaigns. In particular the objectives on public and supporter mobilisation were considered to be highly ambitious as were the objectives on public awareness and engagement.

This was especially relevant to the following ‘measures of success’ (which are captured amongst other measures in Annex 2):

- Raised awareness of the campaign amongst 15-20 million of the UK public as ‘onlookers’ number of UK adults who will have heightened awareness of the campaign’s issue and watch our event/s
- Engaged 3-5 million of the UK’s public as ‘endorsers’ number of UK adults who will take action in support of the campaign
- Public understanding: at least 500,000 members of the UK public have better understanding of the structural causes of food insecurity and hunger and their commitment to tackling global poverty issues increases

It is understood that the mobilisation objectives were drafted by the Communications and Public Engagement Working Groups based, according to one OC member, on a combination of their collective experience of mobilising at scale, the level of ambition the coalition had for the campaign and some consideration of how the growing use of social media may increase reach. The OC and Board signed off these targets, however the process and thinking was not clearly communicated to, or understood by, the wider coalition and they were considered very ambitious by many respondents.

There was also a common and strongly expressed internal perspective that these objectives were ultimately incompatible with the core campaign messages which were quite complex and difficult to communicate. One said, “the public engagement objectives were mismatched with talking about aid and development [and the structural causes].” There was, however, not a particularly strong sense that the high ambition of these targets particularly affected morale of coalition staff in these areas, although there were some comments that the mobilisation objective on ‘endorsers’ was difficult to build confidence on.
Consistency vs. evolving objectives

Over time, and as the political opportunity evolved - in particular the growing political space opening up on tax avoidance and evasion through the work of parliamentary committees and related media coverage - the campaign policy asks increased in ambition. This was useful for the campaign, especially in lobbying terms. One voice close to the conversation with the UK government said: “Tax was a massive struggle but [David] Cameron’s Davos speech made people in the campaign and the OC realise the political feasibility of it, which meant less reluctance… We got way beyond where we thought we would. [The Policy and Advocacy Working Group] led a process to keep increasing our position, to include crown dependences [for example]... It pays to ratchet up”.

However the mobilisation objectives weren’t revised downwards despite some assessments that they were unlikely to be reached. This was discussed in the OC in March 2013 and occasionally at other times: “Looking at the original project plan, we have achieved so much of what we set out to do. The more ambitious targets have not been met – perhaps they were a little too ambitious”.26 There were some comments that these indicators were informed or influenced by what Make Poverty History had achieved rather than a sober assessment of the external context, available time and resources and the potential resonance of campaign messages.

Set against this, there is a plausible argument that while increasing the ambition for the policy asks according to political ambition was sensible, to downgrade other success indicators would in itself have reduced morale and disempowered campaigners endeavouring to deliver on public engagement and supporter mobilisation at a critical time (with the likelihood being that this downgrade would have happened sometime in the spring).

Throughout this period there remained, despite significant efforts, limited time for ongoing review or space for reflection and limited capacity for adaptation of strategy and activities. “We were so focused on the next thing… the energy went into creative campaigning and planning and delivering the next activity… and, to an extent the servicing of supporters”, said one internal interviewee. This is understandable in the context of such a complex and relatively short term ambition in terms of mobilisation changed slowly but palpably and became focused more on servicing existing or ‘core’ supporters. One supporting internal view was that, because of the time pressures involved, the mobilisation of existing supporters was the “starting point but became the end point… the mass public got downgraded. I was sold a concept that this was the new Make Poverty History, and that it would be mainstream. [But if] became something that only cared about political or current supporter audiences.” A probable cause of this is that the campaign lacked sufficient lead-in times and good planning for public engagement and breakthrough into new supporter recruitment. As a consequence many coalition member international NGOs felt they had to put energy into mobilising existing supporters to ensure good profile and visibility at the key moments.

3.2. Outcomes and achievements assessed

Overall analysis

The overall assessment of the outcomes of the campaign is broadly positive. An analysis of the overall measures of success and the monitoring data provided by the campaign, along with feedback from external and internal interviews and focus groups and other data sources, indicates that the campaign has met many of its objectives, made progress on some others and also missed some.

Overall, there is a strong viewpoint within the campaign that the policy outcomes of the campaign, compared to the measures of success set, were very good, especially on tax, but also on nutrition funding pledges and aid commitments. Some external views were less convinced of this but were arguably unaware of the objectives set.

In addition, in other key areas, notably the campaigning confidence and capacity of the sector, there is also an assessment that the campaign has been a qualified success.

One internal view was: “There were really good policy outcomes on aid and tax, good steps [forward]. It felt like we got it on the agenda of the UK government. The campaign created a phenomenal momentum and loads of media. There is a sense of ‘together we are much stronger … the sector is stronger and renewed’.

In areas related to supporter and public mobilisation, and public understanding of the structural causes of poverty and hunger, the overall assessment is less positive. The campaign did not achieve many of the mobilisation targets it set itself, although some of these were arguably unrealistic from the start.
The implication of this may be that the international NGO sector can no longer assume it carries a credible threat of representing substantial public mobilisation in favour of international development and poverty eradication. Communicating this ‘threat’ to policy makers will need to be used with care in the future. Future campaigns will also need to consider whether a longer running and more sustained set of messages to reframe the debate on aid and development would be a useful and realistic response.

**Policy and political outcomes**

**Political traction and cross-party support**

Politically, the campaign was comparatively successful. It has raised international development issues up the UK government agenda, at least for the period of the campaign and it managed to capture a significant portion of the G8 agenda and significant political media attention around the G8. There was also a strong sense – perhaps because of the strength of previous mobilisations and campaigns, especially Make Poverty History – of the power of the campaign to get good access to the top levels of government and open doors for lobbying and detailed proposals that NGOs working alone would have been unlikely to get. “We had a good relationship with government. They were terrified about what we might do and respected what we asked them to do... like the elephant in the room [stunt]... they asked what the campaign wanted. They had respect for us”, said one informed internal respondent. A significant stream of constituency lobbying, with almost 300 MPs lobbied, supported this at the local level.

The monitoring data gathered for this area indicates that over 500 MPs and Lords, across all major political parties, contacted the Treasury in support of the IF campaign which arguably shows a large degree of parliamentary knowledge of and support for the campaign’s aims. This is also supported by an independent survey of MPs carried out during the IF campaign which found that:

- 6% of MPs mentioned the IF campaign as an ‘effective’ lobbying campaign (unprompted)
- 6% of MPs directly linked IF to the issue of ‘global tax avoidance’ (unprompted)
- When prompted, 74% of MPs say they are ‘definitely’ or ‘probably’ aware of the IF campaign
- When prompted, 47% of MPs say they support the IF campaign

The IF campaign was in the top 10 effective lobbying campaigns of 2013, according to a report from nfpSynergy.

The protection and expansion of the perceived political consensus – or at least political majority – in favour of aid and promoting international development was widely claimed as a success both inside and outside the campaign. However, those inside tended to highlight it more readily, whereas those externally tended to downplay its significance as closer to ‘protecting the status quo’. One internal interviewee said: “Carving out political space – building and protecting the cross party consensus – the campaign helped to do this”.

**Policy progress**

**Overall**

There wasn’t an official, detailed, policy verdict. Instead there is a patchwork of internal and external-facing, formal and informal takes on the policy verdict. This leaves the campaign without a clear reference point for the future. The lack of detailed verdict was not – according to informed internal views – a consequence of controversy as the verdict elements were apparently agreed quickly because a lot of preparation went into the scenario forecasting.

However, the chair of the Policy and Advocacy Working Group did produce a useful and important assessment. This overall ‘top-line’ policy assessment, based on the Gold, Silver, Bronze standards that the campaign set itself is outlined in the table in Annex 4. The general feeling of the campaign was that the policy outcomes, from the budget, the nutrition summit and at the G8 were, though not perfect, a very good result. More downbeat pronouncements at the time of the G8 belied a more positive assessment emerging over time from the campaign itself.

**Tax**

Policy advances on tax are widely described as excellent commitments, especially the commitments on the OECD Convention and UK government commitments, with outcomes far exceeding initial expectations. Tax was not strongly integrated as a priority at the campaign’s inception and outset, and was not originally thought to be an area where much progress could be made, but in the end four out of the ten points of the Lough Erne Declaration were about tax and the campaign had contributed to a changed public and political narrative on tax havens.
Questions remain over what these policies will mean in the long run and how they will be translated into action. There is an implication that sustained action and pressure by civil society will be required. It should be noted that there is a strong history in recent years of international NGOs conducting research, developing policy and running campaigns on tax.

The assessment by the chair of the Policy and Advocacy Working Group, as noted above, was that the overall tax outcomes were a mix of gold and bronze results but that they were judged by a standard which far exceeded the initial policy aims on tax. Independent assessments of the tax policy piece were also broadly positive about what had been achieved. Development commentators Owen Barder and Alex Cobham had praised most of the outcomes on tax at Lough Erne, while Richard Murphy of Tax Research UK called it “a turning point” for tax justice, and Kevin Watkins, Director of the ODI called it “a reasonable package”.

Aid
Securing a continued commitment by the UK government in the budget to spend 0.7% of gross national income on aid is showcased as a key success of the campaign, and a prominent policy outcome. The commitment was made, and so the outcome has been successfully achieved, and indeed is now likely to be a sustained political commitment for the lifetime of this parliament until 2015 and through to the next general election.

This outcome was tempered by the lack of legislation to enshrine the 0.7% commitment in law. Although there was a press statement at the time of the Queen’s speech on 8 May 2013 on the lack of legislation, this element was not highlighted in subsequent IF public statements. This was a contentious issue for some in the campaign related to ongoing debates about political positioning.

Nutrition
The Nutrition for Growth: Beating Hunger through Business and Science summit, co-hosted by the governments of the UK and Brazil, and the Children’s Investment Fund Foundation (CIFF) on 8 June in central London pledged substantial sums for nutrition interventions. The summit secured commitments of US$500 million a year between 2013 and 2020 to tackle malnutrition, producing a headline figure of US$4.15 billion over the period. Although some of the detailed policy areas that the campaign hoped to see referenced and addressed were not delivered by the summit, most of those who were keen to see nutrition outcomes were very positive about the overall results. One coalition member respondent stated that the events on nutrition “were undoubtedly of a very significant scale and [have] built a momentum,” while another said “we were involved in the nutrition summit – we thought that was very successful – large amounts of money were pledged. The whole thing was a great success.” However, the summit’s value was questioned by some who felt that it was a more mixed picture, as several of the campaign asks were not met. In particular the expansion of the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, which was a contentious issue within the campaign, was considered by some to be a retrograde step. The response to this aspect of the summit was “heavily negotiated and difficult discussions [led to a] holding line”.

Climate finance
The G8 reaffirmed the commitment made at successive United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) conferences to provide US$100 billion a year of climate finance by 2020, helping developing countries adapt to climate change and mitigate their emissions, but did little to speed up progress of finding the money. This was perhaps as good as could be hoped for at a G8 summit.

Land
It seems that land was overall a less notable area of progress, policy-wise, as recognised in IF materials. However there is a view that the campaign has laid the groundwork for future action on land and biofuels. Land grabbing was recognised in debates including at the pre-G8 Open for Growth event and DFID has recognised that biofuel production is a problem for food security. Land also made it into the Lough Erne declaration, although despite a detectable increase in DFID capacity for research and policy analysis on biofuels, across the board, firm commitments and clear policies are lacking. There is a common feeling, especially among internals that because of effective advocacy work, land now has a firmer political platform: “Land was nowhere but now it has a voice, an entry point”, said one.
FINDINGS & ANALYSIS

Transparency

There is some evidence that reasonable progress was also made on UK government commitments to increase transparency at the G8. This can to some extent be traced back to the effectiveness of the targeted policy dialogue by IF coalition members (and others) in the run up to the G8. This seems to have contributed to commitments including the launch of the G8 Open Data Charter (as well as transparency sections of tax and land); support for work in the African Union’s Land Policy Initiative and strengthening the EITI (Extractives Industry Transparency Initiative). The OGP (Open Government Partnership) also provided “a great hook on beneficial ownership and also mentioned land,” as one coalition member stated. Again these commitments will need to be monitored and pursued by international NGOs to ensure they aren’t just ‘summit rhetoric’ and don’t slip down the political agenda.

Policy progress: attribution and contribution of the campaign

Progress in a number of areas can show a meaningful contribution from the IF campaign. In particular, the nutrition and tax elements of the campaign outcomes show strong levels of contribution. In some areas attribution is claimed, though it is questioned by voices both inside and outside the campaign.

One key aspect for which the campaign has claimed success was the Nutrition Summit and pledges made at it. There is a view from both wider civil society and government that the event wouldn’t have happened in the way that it did without the campaign and that it has acted as a catalyst for future momentum and action by states. There are, however, some questions over whether the summit would have gone ahead in some form anyway, and over the contribution of a range of other organisations and studies that were not, formally at least, part of the campaign.

One informed external view was: “The Nutrition for Growth Summit is definitely attributed to civil society, but that predates the IF campaign. NGOs have set the agenda and [it probably had a] bigger footprint because of the campaign”. Another said: “... on the nutrition stuff, IF may have had some impact ... but there have been a whole range of organisations that have had something to do with this”.

On tax at the G8, again, the fact that tax was on the agenda may not have been due solely to the campaign (as many point out, the public appetite and political context were increasingly conducive for change), but the way that it played out, the emphasis on developing countries and the level of ambition can be traced in substantial part to the role of the campaign and, in particular, the lobbying undertaken under its auspices.

One informed view from government was: “[in terms of the IF contribution] at a high level, it played a significant part in pushing us to a good package but [there were] also some very specific parts of the package where the campaign had attribution. For example, [getting] the overseas territories to sign up”. Another informed civil society view was that the new external opportunities that built on longer term work helped ensure credibility: “the G8 outcome was good ... tax has been bubbling and the campaign was able to capitalise on that and the work that Christian Aid was doing.” From those close to the lobbying effort there was acceptance of the fortunate zeitgeist: “[we would have struggled] without Starbucks-Amazon-Google narrative. Tax was eighth on the G8 agenda – then became top three if not top one”.

On the commitment to provide 0.7% in aid, there are indications from both inside and outside government that the campaign – while not able to claim attribution of a long running campaign to secure this target – certainly contributed to the final stages of delivery and ensure that no backsliding happened at the last minute.

One internal view was: “There have been 40 years of campaigning. But it did create space and pushed them the final mile. [It] would have been easier for the government to backtrack without the campaign”. It is of course important to reflect here too that there has been a long history of the NGO sector campaigning on much of the IF policy agenda; on tax and transparency, on food and nutrition. This has helped to keep these issues on the political agenda, to some extent, but the IF campaign acted as an important accelerator, capitalising on members’ existing agendas, opportunities, expertise and capacities.
There was, however, a feeling both inside and outside the coalition, that while the campaign did make some impact on the promise being kept, it has slightly overplayed the role of the mobilisation elements of the campaign. In this regard, there were comments that some things were attributed to the campaign but were actually more rightly attributed to the overall lobbying strategy, for example the existence and substance of the nutrition summit, as well as the long history of civil society campaigning. In fact this perception was a feature of many external interviews and featured in interviews and focus groups with the wider coalition (that is, those not close to decision-making). One external view was: “They secured 0.7% which was great but some of... the congratulations were a bit too much”.

One critical external civil society explanation of the way that such campaigns tend to describe their role in producing outcomes was: “one of the problems that NGOs face is that we need to have victories once in a while – we tend to go for small victories... there is a tactical question... about the value of small changes versus the longer term. International NGO’s haven't managed to frame the long term narrative”. This is explained by those closer to the centre of the campaign by emphasising the need to explain and promote to supporters their role and that their participation and action has made a difference. It was also important for the choreography of the campaign – especially, because of the timing, in the case of 0.7% - to show progress was being made and inspire further action.

### Internal and other ‘outcomes’ assessed

There are a number of internal and external-facing outcomes and achievements. The monitoring data collected by the campaign – as shown in Annex 3 - helps with an assessment of many of these, set against the campaign’s success measures.

#### Breadth of support

The campaign had good coverage, particularly around and in the run up to the G8. The IF campaign commissioned a media agency, Precise, to examine the quality of the media coverage in line with the measures of success and monitoring log requirement on “Quality/ content of coverage of IF”. The report found that over 90% of IF media coverage was either favourable or emphatically favourable in sentiment, and that policy change led 69% of the coverage. In total there were 3,325 separate pieces of coverage, almost three times the stated target for the campaign. Food, hunger and nutrition – along with tax, trade and economic justice - were the key campaign issues discussed by the mainstream media. The report says that “Aid was the leading key message, whereas transparency was the most fully conveyed across mainstream media. ‘Aid’ was a leading message in broadcasts from the BBC”.

The internal “IF Media Working Group Evaluation” looked at campaign KPI’s for coverage for the three ‘key moments’ and found almost all were met. These were quantitative measures. The report says: “Tax and nutrition were issues that both worked well. Tax coverage built on the zeitgeist in the media landscape and we were able to link our campaign issues to existing outrage about UK tax dodging.”

Again however, the tracking opinion poll research is instructive, strongly indicating that coverage of key campaign messages in traditional media cannot always provide the breakthrough moments. “(NGOs need) greater clarity of what can be achieved through old media – it reached targets but not the public”. The high level of coverage was not recognised by many interviewees - especially externals – who felt that the campaign fell well short of Make Poverty History levels of coverage.

#### The ‘structural causes’

Although the campaign in the end didn’t set out explicitly to reframe the public discourse on poverty, development and hunger as some had originally envisaged,37 this early aim had been translated into key success measures around the structural causes of poverty. According to the tracking opinion poll research carried out by Oxfam in association with Research Now,38 the campaign did not bring about changes in the UK public’s understanding of the structural causes of hunger. The findings concluded that: “the campaign did not bring about a significant decrease in number [of people] wrongly identifying causes of hunger”.39

However some in the campaign are keen to point to the fact that the campaign increasingly highlighted the issue of tax, and also to some degree land grabs. This has led to improved recognition among the media, politicians and core supporters, about some of the key structural causes of hunger and poverty.
‘Endorsers’
According to results shown in the monitoring framework, actions and sign-ups were far lower than expected. For instance, in the category of ‘endorsers’ the total number endorsing the campaign – measured by online actions taken, offline actions taken and number of wristbands purchasers - was 343,617, set against a total target of 3-5 million. The online sign-ups on the IF website reached 101,058, while wristband band purchasing figures reached 95,000 (and the total number of offline actions taken was 147,559).

Impact on the sector (to campaign effectively together in the future)

Capacity aspects
One key area of progress is that the campaign can be said to have re-energised the international development sector’s existing campaigner-activist base, and increased campaigns capacity more generally, defined in the Coalition Surveys as “skills, knowledge and confidence”.

The campaign actions - according to the supporter survey carried out in October 2013 - were largely supported by existing campaigners. When asked whether they had been involved in campaigns about poverty and/or world hunger before the IF campaign, 77% responded “yes”. 57% had heard about the campaign from an organisation they support/receive updates from, suggesting that many were already core supporters of the sector. 96% said that they would be “quite likely” or “very likely” to “support a similar campaign in the future”, suggesting no lack of appetite for taking future action.

The ‘depth’ of support, measured by the number of people taking multiple online actions throughout the campaign, was indicated as a successful area on the Monitoring Framework, which reported that 15% of the people signed up with campaign had taken two or more actions. In the Coalition Data Survey 33% of organisations reported an increase in the depth of support throughout the IF campaign, while, according to the Coalition Feedback Survey, more than 50% of respondents said that the campaign has increased their organisation’s capacity to campaign on any issue.

Related to this is the impact of working together as a sector and demonstrating and amplifying the campaigning strength of the NGO sector. This relates to the point above about protecting the political space. There is evidence across the surveys of supporters and the coalition, and the interviews and focus groups that those involved in the campaign feel more confident both about their sector relationships (see section 2.5 below) and the sector as whole. One internal interviewee said “the sector is in a bit better state now”.

Many of those, when asked about the campaign’s successes in interviews, survey, internal evaluations or focus groups, highlighted the ‘Big Moments’, stunts and the media coverage around these. These were a means to an end but were considered crucially important delivery mechanisms that raised the visibility of the campaign and put some pressure on decision-makers and in particular the UK government. The most frequently mentioned event was the Big IF Hyde park event which (although not without its critics, explored below) was considered to be a watershed moment in the campaign. The stunts included the ‘elephant in the room’, ‘Osborne masks’, and ‘longboats in Northern Ireland’. These were repeatedly referenced as successful, creative and innovative, well managed and influential.

This was a benefit of working together for some respondents: “Creativity and budget for media stunts e.g. George Osborne and flotilla – only in coalition can you do this and be that successful,” said one internal. Another said: “IF improved knowledge and engagement. We felt even more empowered to speak out being part of the IF campaign”. While another praised the organisational achievements: “The George Osborne stunts and Big IF rally [were] amazing despite short lead times... good numbers”. However some said the campaign largely failed to equip activists to mobilise others and supporters to talk to their friends, families and colleagues.
There is a strong indication that, in a professional sense, the capacity of the sector has been increased by the IF campaign. There is evidence – supported by the coalition survey (see below) - of a more confident development sector in campaigning terms and that the UK international NGO sector remains among the most effective campaigning sector in the UK if not globally.

Overall numbers of new supporters that the organisations involved have gained through the period outpaced the agreed measures of success, which, according to the monitoring framework, achieved a 38% increase compared to a 20% target (although over 90% of this increase is accounted for by six organisations).41

One comment from a smaller NGO was: “We are more likely [to come together in future]. We need a break but we have learned that we can do it more effectively. Hopefully we won’t leave it another eight years. [We don’t want to lose] the institutional memory, the things that worked well and things that didn’t. We formed good relationships and it will be easier to pick up the phone”. Another said: “Cross collaborative working was good... IF built relationships amongst organisations like in the Faith Working Group and the Youth Working Group... bringing younger people and groups together”.

Coalition Feedback Survey (September 2013)

“How much has your organisation’s capacity to campaign (on any issue) increased as a result of your involvement in the IF campaign?”

- A significant increase in capacity: 43%
- A slight increase in capacity: 29%
- No change: 15%
- A slight decrease in capacity: 3%
- A significant decrease in capacity: 9%
- Not sure: 1%
Trust aspects

Good practice in network theory indicates that a key element in building the trust and confidence that underpins effective collective advocacy is that members have confidence in decision-making processes. In the early stages of most coalitions, these are often relatively centralised, but with all members having a say, and as trust increases, it becomes possible to move towards ‘distributed leadership,’ through which several partners take delegated responsibility for decisions in specialist areas of work.42

In high-performing networks, collective confidence in the basis of unity and trust in each other can release levels of energy and impact that far exceed those of individual organisations, creating a collective surge based on relatively few participants’ actual work.43 Because of the time-limited nature of the IF campaign these initial stages of forming relationships never really matured beyond that first stage and trust and confidence was predicated, to a large extent, on existing good relationships.

Some respondents argued that the ‘top down’ campaign and formation model hasn’t helped sector trust as whole but trust between some organisations is markedly higher. Overall the analysis is that although it is variable, on balance trust has improved. Those organisations further from the centre of the campaign seem to remain keener to work together again. There was also reported increased mutual trust and networking within Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.

One working group member said: “We have said we want to keep meeting on an informal basis. [There is] real openness and honesty in the meetings. It is good for celebrities to know that we work together... it’s a good thing for agents to understand”. One typical comment that reflects the sometimes strained relationships at the top of the campaign was: “The campaign ended well [at the G8] but this is complicated by the fact that there are some organisations and people we wouldn’t want to work with [so closely] again”.

At the wider level, moving beyond the coalition members, and toward wider civil society there are clear signs that large scale and closely controlled campaigns like IF, Make Poverty History and Jubilee 2000 might struggle in the medium term. Organisations seem to be moving further apart both in political strategy and theory of change terms, as well as in terms of a splintering of subject matter and issue focus, size and political positioning. Many commentators expect there to be more frequent, looser but less ambitious mobilisations in future, perhaps in the form of coalitions on more narrowly defined issues coupled with organisational structures that are more horizontal. One civil society watcher said: “The middle ground has shrunk... it was an uneasy coalition... it was 2005 hangover. The future may well be single issue campaigns”. A challenge for future international NGO coalitions will be that change is more likely to come through sharper focus, a single overarching narrative and networks that organise horizontally and vertically.44

Unintended consequences

One important but largely unintended consequence of the effective lobbying and advocacy was that the campaign policy dialogue helped opened up relevant spaces for others in civil society with a technical competence to occupy. This was commented on by some external stakeholders who noted that, for example, Global Witness and Transparency International provided technical assistance and contributed to some critical thinking on the EITI before and after the G8. Another mentioned the Publish What You Pay coalition’s work on Canada, US and EU legislation on extractives transparency.

Another consequence of the campaign, partly intended perhaps by some participants in the campaign, was the increased interest of some larger NGOs who have now started working on tax issues. The issue is now more firmly on the international development civil society agenda as well as in the media and on the political agenda.

Set against these positive developments, there is also a feeling from some outside the campaign that IF successfully set the political - and to some extent media - agenda on development and therefore dominated the development ‘space’ for the period of the campaign. While this was part of the campaign’s success, the consequence was that those who weren’t involved, or felt they could not be part of it or formally join, struggled at times to deal with attempting to get their own messages across to government and in the media in the run up to the G8.
Outcomes: the nations

Although the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland campaigns supported the main UK campaign calls, the campaigns in the nations cleverly developed their own identity and momentum and there are specific outcomes that can be attributed to them, or to which they have contributed.

In Scotland, in particular, key outcomes on areas specifically targeted by the campaign were highlighted as:

- A doubling of the Climate Justice Fund
- Influencing the terms of the Procurement Reform Bill published in October 2013, on support for fair and ethical trading
- Greater investment for development education in the form of new core funding for six Development Education Centres in global citizenship education

There was a strong sense amongst interviewees that these outcomes can be attributed to, at least in part, the Scottish IF campaign. One interviewee with in-depth knowledge of the campaign and Scottish politics said: “on climate justice [fund] and development education centre funding, I don’t think they would have happened without the IF campaign."

Strategies and tactics employed

The different strategies and tactics employed by the campaign were numerous, interconnecting and grew over time. The key ways in which the campaign attempted to influence and achieve its objectives was by:

- mobilising supporters and the wider public to take action
- mobilising key sections of supporters and the public through multipliers – faith groups, diaspora groups, youth groups, etc.
- through the mainstream media, using news and PR (celebrity-driven coverage)
- through social media, especially Twitter
- through lobbying (in Whitehall and in Parliament), including the ‘pre-lobbying’, and through policy analysis
- through stunts and events

Effectiveness of strategies and tactics

The strategies employed

The campaign used media stunts, lobbying and digital strategies, plus a significant public mobilisation, which together were effective in terms of producing the appearance of a mass mobilisation and in retaining the mobilisation threat associated with the sector. However, it lacked the scale of previous efforts and this is a risk going forward. One internal interviewee commented: “It didn’t catch the eye of the public as much as Make Poverty History, but I still think we pulled it off. [We were] disciplined, we got people to Hyde Park, the government was impressed, but not overly so”.

In mobilisation terms, across Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland, there is a sense that the campaign both enhanced mutual trust and confidence and networking potential within the NGOs and gave a welcome focus to local activists, perhaps through being able to operate within a different, more conducive policy and political devolved space. One view from Wales was: “It was good to have a story to tell the Welsh public - the major organisations began to work together more." In Northern Ireland there was political interest from the Northern Ireland legislative Assembly, “that was due to breadth of the coalition” and a feeling that IF has “strengthened the movement in Northern Ireland... public awareness and promotion of the issues … nearly every church in Northern Ireland has an IF banner on.” A motion at the Northern Ireland legislative Assembly was passed in June in support of IF aims.

3.3. Strategies and tactics

This section looks at the effectiveness of the campaign’s key strategies and tactics.

Overall, the campaign employed a skilful mix of media stunts, lobbying and digital tactics, plus a significant mobilisation, to produce an appearance of mass mobilisation that helped enable access to and action by government. The campaign retained the mobilisation threat of previous campaigns and most accept that it did enough to protect the sector’s position as one of the UK’s top campaign mobilisers. However the lack of mobilisation on the scale of previous coalition campaign efforts is acknowledged as a risk going forward.
Some painted an alternative hypothetical picture. One internal said: “If they had started (only) three months earlier, it would have peaked at the January launch and probably had more public break-through by the time of the G8.” The lack of lead-in time to plan and build capacity was identified by other respondents from smaller organisations as having a negative impact on their ability to deliver in good time, particularly for some identified constituencies.

In terms of the key tactics and strategies used, analysis of the overall strategy for the campaign is complicated by the fact that it changed in emphasis throughout the period of the campaign. The ambition - as witnessed by the Measures of Success document and the IF Strategy - was to mobilise significantly large sections of the UK public to produce a movement capable of driving significant policy change.

One finding that emerged strongly is that the ‘loose-tight’ strategy that the coalition employed didn’t work as well as expected. The idea was that three main moments would produce tightly controlled coalition activities with looser periods in between. These would be filled with organisations adding their own activity in order to keep momentum up. It appears that this model worked well in Scotland where opportunities for influencing a national agenda were taken up by the Scottish IF Campaign. In the UK-wide campaign in practice, however, while the tighter controlled parts were mainly successful, the ‘looser’ periods acted like vacuums, with inadequate activities and momentum. Moreover, this direction and campaign momentum was inclined to push those implementing the campaign towards the big moments, partly as a consequence of late planning and delayed decision-making.

There were also a few comments in interviews and focus groups questioning the degree to which some agencies really put their organisational weight behind the campaign at key moments, and especially, at the looser times. Organisational commitment, especially in the first three months, was described by more than one respondent as ‘patchy’, although the momentum picked up – as one would expect and hope – in later periods. This challenge in maintaining campaign momentum was particularly problematic for the purposes of building public support around the core campaign narrative.

Related to this was a tendency to repeat what had been done in the past. The de facto campaign strategy was, at times of uncertainty and disagreement, more backward looking than it might have been. “Make Poverty History always sat over IF – it was most people’s frame of reference”. Set against this was the significant investment in digital campaigning, which was a distinct area of innovation. It is also notable that – in terms of some key areas such as the marketing budget – the campaign had less to spend than Make Poverty History and so, arguably, less freedom to take big risks.

The choreography of the campaign was not helped by what many regarded as periodic online-offline disjointedness. The offline and online elements did not always support each other as well as they might. “IF did some great things digitally and online but the two [offline and online] weren’t integrated. Digital wasn’t there at the top table... If we were more joined up then we could have looked even bigger”. In Supporters Survey, some promoted the view that “the campaign suffered from too much online and not enough attention to the offline” (a view which is also reflected in some interviews with faith groups, particularly with older demographics and the ability to reach offline audiences through churches for example).

In terms of power analysis, a short written version of which was detailed in the IF Strategy, the assessment was limited: “Although some policy progress is possible, overall the likelihood of major policy progress on the structural causes of food poverty during the campaign is limited, but there are clear victories to be won in terms of putting these issues firmly on the global agenda and building strong public awareness as a foundation for subsequent policy victories.”

Mobilisation
The campaign had an ambitious and intricate mobilisation-engagement model on which targets and measures of success were based, as shown below.
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IF Campaign Engagement Outcome Model

The ambition

Advocate
Enlisting, Galvanising, Recruiting, Evangelising

450,000 - 500,000

Activist
Socially proven support & “sit forward” engagement. Emotionally invested

1.5 - 2 million

Endorser
Buy and wear campaign identifier. Not proactively ‘sneezing’

3.5 - 5 million

Aware
‘Keeping and eye on this’; aware without prompting

7 - 10 million

Onlooker
Mass reach - the ‘public cloud’; aware when prompted

15 - 20 million
An analysis of the effectiveness of the mobilisation elements of the campaign suggests starting with a conceptual split into two main groups: the core supporters of the development sector, many of whom were engaged by the campaign and took action, and the wider public, who were not engaged in large numbers and the mobilisation numbers were low (see comments above). Aside from some over ambitious target-setting discussed above on the mass mobilisation front, the large scale mobilisation was limited in its success. One of the main ongoing methods of mass mobilisation was online actions, and there is sense that the relationship between this and decision-makers wasn’t sufficiently strong or plausibly thought through. However, the experience in the nations was different and, in general, much more positive, to the extent that mobilisation played an important influencing role.

There is a common view that the chosen mass offline ‘action’ of showing support for the campaign by wearing a wristband didn’t work well, either as a sign of wider public commitment to campaign objectives or as a contribution to intended campaign revenue. “We got the wrong product”, said one internal. Another respondent questioned why such a product was repeated from Make Poverty History and described as “no longer cool ... too childish”. It was also suggested that better ideas could have been developed with more time and had some of the ideas from the working groups been used.

Another issue frequently mentioned as an explanation for low levels of wider public support was the external context, which with a strong emphasis on austerity and anti-aid sentiment was not ideal for capturing the public imagination, although some felt that a stronger effort to link austerity here with poverty in the south could have been made. This perspective was illustrative of a challenge to the predominant orthodoxy that public mobilisation is a pre-requisite in an international NGO coalition campaign. A deeper analysis of the rationale for mobilisation and its contribution to policy objectives needed to be in place.

Externally and internally there was a strong view that the campaign did not amount to a movement but had captured an appetite amongst existing supporters to take part in something big. Furthermore, most member organisations were used to a broadcast model of campaigning not a bottom-up model of campaigning. “It felt like re-energising more than movement building ... It was too focused on big moments ... doesn’t feel [like a movement] from an external perspective”. This sentiment was supported by some of the internal evaluations done by working groups some of which also referenced the framing and communications challenges in relation to mobilisation. For instance the Supporter Journey Working Group evaluation found that: “The framing ... under the hunger banner might not have rung true, the campaign became one about ‘tax justice and hunger’, and there was little explicit material actually about hunger, as a result the campaign was a bit hollow, which made it harder to mobilise”.

For some the mobilisation never fully appeared in the expected way. According to one respondent, a decision-making politician in Scotland was said to have commented to the campaign that he was waiting for a mass mobilisation which never really materialised. Many also felt (in particular those not central to decision-making) that by June a certain amount of energy for mobilisation had been generated, only for it to have been allowed to quickly dissipate. One interesting point made by a small but significant number of interviewees was that the purpose of mobilisations – especially large scale mobilisation towards the end of large campaign such as IF – is more relevant to the future than the current campaign, in the sense that the mobilisation in the current period will to some extent affect politicians’ belief in the threat of the extent of mobilisation next time around.

The IF ‘brand’

The campaign brand was subject to contention from the planning stages of the campaign. Two creative agencies had pitched branding ideas. The ‘winning’ brand was felt to embody the brief best and was agreed by the OC. The final outcome was a generally unloved element of the campaign, although many accepted that it was a challenging brief and that the creative work was largely technically well executed. One internal said: “The idea of using food to talk about loads of issues makes sense. But when the agency came back they were struggling to put everything into a simple catchphrase ... The ‘IF’ bit was usable but the whole title was too long”.

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In terms of the brand elements, the campaign name was not popular either inside or outside the campaign, although neither was it universally unpopular. The name itself had multiple challenges. It was felt to be too long but also not explanatory enough. It didn’t have an in-built call action as Make Poverty History did, and it didn’t work well with social media or with the mainstream media. One typical internal comment was: “It didn’t work at all. It was a bad decision from the beginning, it was a big challenge”.

The look-and-feel design elements of the brand received a more mixed reception, but are still somewhat negatively viewed both internally and externally. Those who felt they understood what it was trying to do were sympathetic. “I broadly liked the logo [it was] fresh, engaging” said one. Another who was close to the brand decision-making pointed out that the brief, context and policy platform made the brand hard to get right and even harder to build: “It was better than people think. The campaign played well with a warm audience... and the kids’ films... the brand positioning was better than Make Poverty History. The brand was never going to come through that strongly because we were always going to lead with a policy issue”.

One reason that the brand struggled was, therefore, because the policy platform and hunger overlay were themselves multifaceted and the layers of messages and complexity to get across made the mechanics of the brand challenging. One internal comment was: “The brand, on aid and food, was quite difficult and had too many lenses”.

Another reason that the brand suffered was that the marketing budget behind it was very limited and inadequate (despite requests from those working on marketing within the campaign). The marketing strategy therefore relied on organisations using the brand which some felt was not taken up sufficiently by coalition members to develop significant brand recognition.

In general terms, although well executed, many of communications aspects of the campaign struggled to ‘punch through’ and – in the same way as the brand – had to grapple with the complexity of the message. Among the exceptions to this were the campaign promotional films, which had mostly positive comments and reflections by those that saw them. One informed external respondent said: “There were some excellent assets created that aren’t [likely to be] dated - such as ‘aid what it is good for’ – which are popular and useable”. An internal said: “the films and messaging explained it very well but [ultimately] I don’t think it was as visible”.

Stunts and moments

The success, and - to a large extent - the effectiveness of the campaign’s stunts represent another area of agreement among the data sources for this evaluation. For instance, the final coalition-wide survey asked people what their “favourite thing” about the campaign was and many mentioned or highlighted the stunts, moments and, in particular, the Big IF. Feedback from government tends to confirm the importance of these moments and stunts. One government insider said: “All stunts make a difference, ministers are watching”.

The Big IFs

The Big IF London moment was recognised as crucially important in terms of living up to the ‘implied threat’ of public engagement and mobilisation in support of the campaign, based on previous mobilisations by the international development sector. Although much of the work had been done by the time of the rally the feeling was that if it had ending up being a flop it would have affected the ability to deliver quite so much, especially at the G8. “It wouldn’t have been so easy without it, [the] feedback was people felt it had been important in government” while one government insider said: “The Big IF definitely was noticed”.

There was a feeling amongst some civil society groups that the event was in keeping with the rest of the campaign in terms of the numbers of supporters engaged. However, the lack of mass scale and the lower turn out than previous campaigns was noted, but also understandable given the context. “Getting 45,000 people in Hyde Park [shows] there is still a real interest ... a reservoir of public interest but they didn’t get out beyond the base”, said one external commentator with good knowledge of the sector.

According to a survey of people at the rally in Hyde Park, 39% of respondents said they heard about the event through an organisation. 67% said they strongly agreed that they were attending in order to “pressure politicians to make things change” and 60% said they were there “to raise public awareness” about international development issues.
Another attendee reflected a small minority opinion that the content of the rally was not what it could have been. “The rally was a missed opportunity to [educate]. The rally speeches were a bit samey and underestimated the knowledge of the rally [attendees]”. Although some commentators liked the ‘spinning flowers’ element of the rally, others felt it was quite expensive and not particularly effective.

The church service and other initiatives that ran alongside the rally garnered strong praise from some of those involved from the faith sector. Most that commented were complimentary about the organisation and content of the Big IF event in Belfast.

The boats stunt, the ‘elephant in the room’ and George Osborne masks

The ‘elephant in the room’ stunt was felt to be particularly impactful because it was noticed by government and led the Chancellor to tweet about the campaign, showing that the message had “gone right to the top”. The Chancellor said in his tweet: “Powerful #elephantintheroom campaign, showing that the message led the Chancellor to tweet about the ‘elephant in the room’ and George Osborne masks element of the rally, it was noticed by government and to be particularly impactful because it was noticed by government and led the Chancellor to tweet about the campaign, showing that the message had “gone right to the top”.

The boats stunt was deliberate, bespoke and valid. It was a calculated choice that most people (internally and externally) were generally supportive of. There was a strong sense that this part of the strategy was deliberate, bespoke and valid. "Organisations that had been more outsider, went more insider. Things were going on at G20 and OECD which meant it was a good time to push for tax on the inside", said one OC member.

There was a significant minority group of others who were more circumspect and many were at the limits of their comfort zones: “I feel torn about talking to government. One outsider commented: “Cameron needed to put in some spadework. He didn’t start to focus on the summit until two weeks before. Blair and Brown were more committed... [in that sense] they gave Cameron an easy ride... they worried about being over critical and pulled their punches”.

Although the media stunts at the G8 probably came too late to have a big impact on campaign outcomes, the coalition managed to get good media coverage at the G8 itself, arguably keeping leaders on their toes. One internal informant said: “I am [proud of] the wall-to-wall media coverage during the G8, [especially] the boat stunts. We worked well with a bored media.”

Government relations/Policy and Advocacy Working Group

The lobbying element of IF is another area that comes in for widespread praise, both internally and externally. Although the Policy and Advocacy Working Group was large, cumbersome and had challenges, a small core group within it reportedly worked very effectively together. It was described as a “slick machine”. One member of the group said: “We built an amazing lobbying machinery very quickly. We strategised together and pushed organisations from the first IF meeting”. Another insider also recognised the importance of the pre-campaign lobbying that helped shape and set the agenda for the campaign, the government and, by turn, the G8: “It wasn’t all a foregone conclusion and it was done brilliantly well and managed well. The work with No 10, the DFID leveraging [key prominent people] as well, was a huge achievement... the pre-lobbying also worked well”.

Overall, the lobbying, government relations and political engagement was agile enough in itself to respond to changes in the external environment, coupled with an ability to play to coalition members’ key competencies and areas of expertise although at times this suffered from an unclear primary focus (0.7%, tax, transparency, nutrition) at key stages.
Another said: “budget day was the low point saying only positive things ... they [the campaign] almost overplayed their hand ... [on the other hand] the G8 response by IF was stronger and better than I expected [which] was down to the fact that government had promised [more than they delivered] and therefore the outcome was a disappointment”.

However another outsider had a different viewpoint, reflecting some interpretations that the public positioning was, in fact, quite negative and anti-business at times: “When you looked beyond the rhetoric, the report and positions were much clearer and well-articulated. Detailed policy for the G8 was well pulled together but the public media-facing piece was more negative.”

One informed insider felt that the campaign had got the balance of ‘good cop/ bad cop’ right. “We achieved a good balance between maintaining a diplomatic position with government, while still able to put the spotlight on failings through the ‘elephant in the room’ stunt... or [by piling on] the pressure for delivery in line with our political strategy like our response to the PM’s letter to UK [tax] havens or IF’s open letter to the PM raising concerns about the lack of ambition ahead of the Nutrition for Growth event). This insider also noted: “It is worth recognising that the interest in the campaign from government was because we were threatening to recreate Make Poverty History – hence DFID and other lobbying targets had us straight through the door to present the new campaign as soon as they heard about it.”

Parliament

The IF campaign had a good profile and wide support in parliament, as outlined above. Figures from NFP Synergy Charity Parliamentary Monitor\(^2\) suggest that the actions taken by MPs in support of the campaign were considerably higher than in an average year. According to interviewees 50-60 MPs tweeted during the Twitter day of action where the campaign asked MP’s to tweet about IF. One said: “It was such a public way and easy to lend their voice and showed Cameron and Greening that we had traction in parliament as well. We learned how you could use these techniques with MPs... [there was] lots of cool learning”.

One respondent close to the parliamentary work said that it wasn’t always easy to get meetings with MPs, but that “when we did it was effective. MPs did what we asked”. Constituency lobbying of MPs was also a strong strand of the lobby effort.

There was a feeling amongst some executing the parliamentary work that while the Policy and Advocacy Working Group was concentrating on a higher level of lobbying, and the Parliamentary Group was only allowed to contact backbenchers, there was a slice of parliament - junior ministers and shadow ministers - that weren’t targeted as much as they might have been and consequently “fell between two stools”.

Media

As outlined above, the London-based media group managed collectively to attain lots of - almost exclusively positive – coverage for the campaign and its aims. There is also evidence of good and strengthened relationships with some journalists, according to interviewees. One external viewpoint was: “In the Media [Working Group] they were really good ... managed to get to the point where anyone who was vaguely interested in these issues would have noticed what went on”.

Media was identified by the campaign as a key intermediary for getting the campaign messages both to supporters and to government. It was also a key area identified in the measures of success and IF strategy documents as a campaign target in itself.\(^3\) This arguably gave media coverage a higher status in the campaign that might have been the case if it had not been a specific objective.

A separate media group was established in Scotland comprising seven to eight media professionals that operated autonomously of the London media group. The strategy was aimed at engaging with the distinctiveness of the Scottish media and the output was a reasonable proportion of the IF campaign’s total media coverage. Similar groups existed in Wales and Northern Ireland.
Despite these successes there were some frustrations. In some ways, the media work was disconnected from the overall strategy and OC, and arguably suffered from a lack of formal representation on the OC. The media group certainly felt that the campaign was not always listening to their needs and concerns, sometimes misunderstood what it needed, and was stuck in an older model of how to get media coverage. There was a feeling amongst some that the media work needed to be situated within a clear overarching communications strategy, and that messages couldn’t be sufficiently tailored to a modern-day media reality. The sign-off process was also a common complaint from the media groups, as well as what was perceived by some as over-sensitivity about the policy message and risk-aversion. One informed internal said: “They were on transmit mode: an old-fashioned, broadcast model. Media work is now about understanding what the public care about and tailoring your message to that”.

In addition the media effort struggled with the same issues as other public-facing elements of the campaign like the complexity of the message, delays in planning and inadequate thinking about pacing and playing to current media interest. The Media Working Group internal evaluation recognised this: “The messaging was confusing … There seemed a disregard by OC for building on existing public opinion or media zeitgeist… over-reliance on our existing supporters.”

For a campaign of this size and ambition, there were too few policy ‘products’ to ensure good quality media coverage, with policy depth. Some NGOs produced policy reports but they were too infrequent to keep the media interested. There were comments that the media work was too celebrity focused, but it is clear that the group felt acute demands from the centre for it to use celebrities. The enduring shortage of policy and news-led stories generated by the coalition also meant that PR-based media work, using celebrities, was the main viable choice.

**Media ‘purdah’**

The campaign had agreed that at key times members would subsume all organisational designations under the IF brand in terms of media work. This ‘purdah’ was an aspiration that all spokespeople were to be described as IF spokespeople. Although good practice, in theory this seemed to have rather a chilling effect on coverage at these times. Many members considered it a necessary discipline; lots were also inhibited from taking the initiative. There were strong suggestions that some organisations broke the purdah rules. Smaller organisations strove to follow purdah rules but also struggled with the complexity of them and the application of them under different scenarios. Overall, however, smaller organisations probably benefited from the purdah rules in the sense that if they hadn’t existed then larger organisations would doubtless have dominated the coverage.

**Digital**

There is a broadly positive digital evaluation commission by the Digital Working Group (conducted by The Small Axe). It is clear that this work generated significant volume with overall traffic analysis measured at 2.25 million views of pages on the IF website, with social media exposure calculated at 165,718 mentions of IF, and a total of over 3.4 million interactions with IF across all social media channels, with an analysis of demographics being a slightly older audience than anticipated and more females (65%) than males (35%).

Overall, the digital engagement within the sector was innovative, well respected and was noticed by some external opinion formers. However there were issues with wider engagement and the extent to which this strategy ‘broke through’ and reached a wider audience.

The external analysis commissioned by the Digital Working Group found that although content was imaginative, engaging and well-shared (such as the ‘What has aid ever done for anyone’ YouTube film), momentum was lost in the quieter times between the campaign peaks. This led to lower levels of engagement and fewer repeat actions than might have been seen if the campaign didn’t have such dips in momentum.

The IF digital strategy had three interlinked objectives: to broaden awareness, to deepen engagement and to demonstrate impact. It was developed relatively quickly in order to support the wider campaign objectives around public understanding of causes of poverty. The three interlinked objectives represent a logical structure and a helpful framework to assess the contribution of digital activities to the campaign’s objectives.
The internet search trends over the six-month period January to June indicate peaks over time that are strongly correlated to media stories about tax evasion and avoidance (the work of Margaret Hodge’s Select Committee, Starbucks, Amazon, Google and Jimmy Carr). This coverage prompted wider public interest in and support for tax reforms and helped build on the history and credibility of NGO and civil society campaigning in this policy area for many years.

According to research on IF Twitter activity undertaken by UCL, the overall IF Twitter profile consisted of 101,842 overwhelmingly positive tweets, mainly of general nature (that is, not topic specific but supportive of IF generally), and little of which could be described as a ‘public conversation’ and mostly ‘isolated tweets’. Tax was the key issue in issue-specific tweets and although aid was quite prominent, it featured mainly around the budget. Land was lower profile but more evenly spread. Unsurprisingly perhaps, Tweets came mostly in spikes which tended to follow the campaign moments in the way that media and mobilisation activity did.55 ‘Rallying Cries’ and celebrity endorsement were two of the most useful types of social media posts (in terms of numbers of favouriting, likes, retweets and comments). In particular, the ‘Rallying Cries’ (such as “1 in 8 people go hungry in the world. Imagine #IF we could be generation to end this. Join us 8 Jun, Hyde Park [link]”) appeared to generate deeper engagement (sharing and retweeting rather than simply ‘liking’ or ‘favouriting’), while celebrity endorsement generated slightly shallower engagement but in higher numbers. There were particular problems mentioned by interviewees around the use of #IF, which apparently didn’t work well on Twitter as it was too generic. One comment in the focus groups was that some older people found social media difficult to access, and that this campaign was difficult to access without some knowledge and ability of social media.
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There was a strong opinion amongst some of those at the centre that this campaign should promote digital engagement more than previous campaigns and that digital should be a key and prominent strategy. However, there were problems with delivery: “Everything came far too late” was a common refrain.

The website split respondents’ views, with some externals expressing positive assessments. However, most internal respondents were disappointed with the final outcome and usability of the website. The website could have worked better to give people their next step after taking action, and made it easier to find out about the campaign in depth. There was good content on the site but it was not always easy to find, and putting up new content could take some time, though this reportedly improved later in the campaign. One blunt view was: “the website was ... hard to use ... There were two main purposes - to make it easy to explore the issues and take the hand raiser action – it failed on both. The website ‘visualiser’ was the expensive bit and didn’t work well”. Another was: “The main website idea was social: ‘IF Live’, but because there weren’t that many people it tended to look sparse and wasn’t great for older people”.

Social media worked well in the main as a strategy for getting the attention of political insiders and campaign professionals, although it didn’t have an ‘organic life’ in the sense of stimulating public conversations about the campaign and its issues.

However, in terms of its effectiveness in the political sphere there is feedback that the digital presence worked, in particular during the key moments of the budget campaigning and around the G8. One internal close to government said: “The digital stuff helped ... the online mobilisation, Justine Greening said so”. One outsider said it was “really powerful on the launch, every development organisation was tweeting”. There was some evidence that the conversation online was notably quiet outside of the key influencing moments. One government insider said: “[Special Advisers] watch Twitter closely, there was less than we thought there might have been... it makes you question how much the public at large seized the agenda”.

Celebrity

The IF campaign did have a number of key successes with engaging celebrities, who drove much of the social and traditional media coverage. The Big IF Hyde Park event was particularly noted for the success of getting celebrities to attend and speak. However, the coalition had arguably underestimated the growing competition amongst charities for celebrities’ time and endorsements. This was felt keenly in the attempt to recruit. “It is a crowded market – more than ever. Even small charities [have celebrity coordinators] and artists have to be really considered about who to support and that they don’t support too many different charities... their support needs to have integrity,”66

Celebrity recruitment also sometimes suffered from the fact that agents didn’t know the IF brand and campaign. Celebrities, like many outsiders, found it quite complex and difficult to break down into manageble calls for support like some other campaigns. This was a broader campaign issue rather than something that was celebrity specific: “They understood the top line but as soon as you started to get into the steps that need to be taken it got a bit complicated. It wasn’t easy to talk about the issues. We tried to break it down – but there was no quick and easy way to give people the background”, said one insider. Although not explicitly vocalised, the issue of tax could have made some celebrities nervous about the potential for having their own tax affairs in the public and media spotlight and thus may have represented a blockage to some getting involved.

Some interviewees, survey respondents and focus group participants were uncomfortable with the disproportionate level of focus on celebrities in the campaign and some also referenced Finding Frames in this regard. The celebrities aspect of NGO campaigning has a history of being a contested strategy within the sector, for example its level of importance within a change theory, and the IF campaign coalition was no different in trying to balance diverse views among its members. The overall feeling in this group was that the celebrity strategy was somewhat disconnected to - and ill-fitted with - the overall strategy for the campaign which was laden with complex messaging and had a policy focus.
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**Diaspora**

The IF campaign’s links with diaspora organisations significantly exceeded previous efforts by the sector to involve diaspora organisations in an inclusive and meaningful way. Once established, the Diaspora Working Group developed a strategy to reach out to Black and Minority Ethnic media, it delivered training to diaspora organisations aiming to hold a space for a collective diaspora voice to be heard on campaign issues, help explain the campaign’s added value and break down understandable negative perceptions. Twenty diaspora organisations joined and collectively planned and delivered a range of supporting campaign activities.

However there were challenges to overcome. Two particular concerns emerged that were well articulated during the evaluation research. Firstly, that policy asks could not be taken to broader communities as initially had been presented, and secondly and perhaps more importantly, that the lack of southern voices at the heart of the campaign led to questions with regards to framing. In one expression: “It seemed to be an old fashioned view of development”.

Nevertheless, there is now an ongoing programme of work that has been inspired by IF campaign coalition processes, which some say has acted as a catalyst to seriously address perceptions of marginalisation of the diaspora community within the sector.

Sufficient appetite apparently exists to consider how to sustain partnerships and maintain momentum and in October an international NGO roundtable on diaspora helped to identify “two to three project areas of future collaboration”. Evidence points to a reinvigoration of Diaspora for Development (plus a motion passed at Bond AGM in November).

**Faith**

Much of the IF offline supporter mobilisation could be attributed to the efforts of the faith organisations. The Faith Working Group was in this sense a good example of devolved decision-making authority and releasing creative energy which has built trust and may stay together, in fact the Faith Campaigners Group has been established and is due to reconvene at a meeting in January 2014.

The church service before the Big IF rally was a particular success. It was well attended but also contributed in part to successfully swelling numbers at the rally itself. In Northern Ireland, the church service was a reportedly significant moment of unity across the churches and as such had an impact beyond the campaign. There were also strong efforts to reach out to a wider range of faith groups than previous coalition campaigns.

However, there were many challenges in relation to campaign supporter mobilisation, not least lead-in times and the finite duration of the IF campaign per se. There was a sense – as was the case in other areas of the campaign - that more early planning, a greater buy-in from faith groups and a clearer theory of change that was explicit about how mobilisation would contribute to the campaign’s objectives, would have been helpful.

One informed external commentator said: “There was a need to articulate where we can add value but also about how faith leaders can add value. [I] would have brought us in earlier on ... the churches have a long lead in time”. Another said: “There could have been more engagement with faith-based youth [groups]”.

**Youth and schools**

Youth and schools were another good example of devolving decision-making authority to help release creative energy. In general the group worked well together. As part of the IF campaign a number of schools visited No.10 to deliver a “plate petition” to the Prime Minister. The plates included messages from the children and young people on how we could ensure there is enough food for everyone. This element of the campaign was well respected and considered to have a high impact for a relatively low investment of resources.

There was a general concern that opportunities to involve youth were not really exploited and some felt the materials were “too dry” and that not all the good ideas from the Youth Working Group were taken on board and that there was a lack of young voices on other groups. The Youth Working Group Evaluation notes that: “As the Youth Working Group we sometimes felt quite separate to the main campaign.”

**Private sector**

The organisations involved in the IF campaign have a diversity of approaches to the private sector. The private sector strategy suffered from a lack of agreed approach from the beginning at senior levels in the coalition. The Private Sector Working Group self-evaluation states: “The internal structure of the campaign... did not set a broad and coherent strategy for multinational corporations or the wider private sector”.

In addition, tax as an issue proved somewhat problematic for the strategy as it was seen by some companies as anti-corporate. Companies were involved too late, and were not really part of the discussion.
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One external voice contended: “The biggest issue was that it was quite business-negative ... [there was] not much positive about the role of business ... we were just asked to endorse, it was all or nothing. There were too many asks and it didn’t correlate back. Tax doesn’t link to food security ... It is quite nice to involve others in the co-creation of the campaign. It felt like we were a bit of an afterthought. There was a general feeling (amongst businesses that had been approached) of the need to come to us earlier.”

**Lifestyle**

The ‘lifestyle’ campaign actions – change and actions that people could make in their own lifestyles to play their part in the campaign – were considered a potentially important element for engagement at the early stage of planning. The elements – consisting of guides to Fairtrade and sustainable eating practices - came late and didn’t in the end make up a key part of the campaign. One coalition survey respondent said: “The lifestyle element of the campaign was too late and a missed opportunity to reach the public”. The Lifestyle Working Group did not produce an informal internal evaluation.

**3.4. Structure, organisation and management**

Overall, the structure and management of the IF campaign worked reasonably well, delivering a major workload in a complex environment and for an ambitious campaign. However the structure was also widely thought to be complex, too vertical and lacking clear processes at times on sign-off, decision-making and leadership.

**Overall structure**

The overall coalition and campaign structure and organisation allowed the campaign to function moderately well. The structure of the coalition was designed in an attempt to balance the perceived need for control and direction with enablement. According to the coalition Organising Principles document, the campaign coalition agreed to: “operate under an ‘Empowered Network Model’ that seeks to strike the balance between empowering members and providing effective working.”

Besides being widely thought of as too complex, vertically oriented and lacking in clear processes, the structure was also said to have sometimes constrained creativity and operational activity. It was hierarchical and ‘top down’ and ‘command and control’ were the phrases commonly used to describe the feeling that too much power was held at the higher levels of the campaign, particularly at the OC. However, the necessity for clear messages and discipline, together with the length of the campaign and diversity of the coalition, explain this tendency to some degree. Some OC members concurred with this analysis. One said: “Bit too top down. We could have found a better balance”. Another said: “We created another organisation in its own right and that [conflicted] with [one’s] own organisation. There was a massive bureaucracy. [It wasn’t quite] ‘command and control’... but there are better models... We could have had a looser coalition”.

**Coalition spread and range**

The campaign had, by the close, 213 member organisations, mainly from international development backgrounds, but also many faith and diaspora organisations and social enterprises. The degree to which the coalition managed to reflect a wide and diverse constituency of support was varied. There was a good spread from the international development sector, but less diversity from other areas of civil society. Many interviewees felt that the coalition would have been stronger with more environmental organisations and trade unions, for instance, as had been originally intended at inception. However, there was success reaching beyond development groups to some food groups and particular success in reaching Muslim and Jewish faith groups. The campaign was also felt by some to be limited in its ability to make visible the existing breadth and diversity of the coalition. This is possibly due to a number of factors including the relative power and resources of the larger organisations and the finite time available to build a movement for change. Some organisations signed up for IF but that didn’t necessarily translate into delivery or engagement. There were also a number of comments in the working group evaluations that working groups would like to have worked together more amongst themselves to harness potential synergies and common agenda but that the coalition structure limited such opportunities.
Management, organisation and decision-making

There is a strong sentiment within the campaign at all levels that recognition is needed of extraordinary hard work of key people, organisations and volunteers in the campaign. During the main period of the campaign many worked long hours, and most had their own organisational commitments to fit in around the campaign. One said: “People worked incredibly hard and long hours. There was ... personal sacrifice”. Overall, the campaign was mostly managed and organised to a functional level and - though tensions occurred and limitations of management and organisation arose - the key aspects and outputs of the campaign continued to be delivered.

One issue that frequently arose in internal interviews and focus groups was the feeling that chairs of working groups should have been given more power, status and operational independence. This, it was felt, would have allowed more activity and innovation. One said: “A flowering of creativity happened when power was devolved”. There were also some signs of a centralising tendency, which, some speculated, came from the early policy negotiations and the campaign formation stage.

The proliferation of working groups worked against the smaller organisations who struggled to attend the relevant meetings and deliver needed capacity. One internal commentator said: “Elements worked well but then it grew so huge that [it] become unmanageable, when it got so big. There were too many working groups, too many meetings. You had to be quite ruthless about what you could go to. This [meetings culture] is partly cultural in the sector.”

The Organising Committee, Board, Working Groups relationships

The Board

The Board, whose role was one of oversight and campaign governance, in general terms was found to have worked well and was useful for internal organisational commitment and alignment among key members of the coalition. One OC member said: “[Having the Board meant] we got buy in from bosses. It was a good way of involving CEOs and built coherence amongst the organisations themselves [internally, across functions] and beyond BOAG”. There is a strong case to be made for the quality of leadership that CEOs provided for the IF campaign within the Board and at their respective NGOs, although the inclination to sometimes represent their individual organisations at coalition meetings, rather than consider the interests of the campaign as a collective priority was a perceived weakness. For example, the Board was sometimes asked to act as an arbiter when problems lower down the coalition were escalated.

An additional challenge was the space that the Board and the OC occupied, relative to strategic governance and operational delivery. It seemed to some that at times that they “bumped into each other” as both sought to make decisions on strategies and activities.

The Organising Committee (OC)

The OC itself was relatively healthy as a decision-making forum and had mainly good functional working relationships. One OC member said: “It mainly worked well together... it was well chaired and effective”. However the dynamic was strained at times by differences, mainly on policy aspects and sometimes on political strategy. At times strategic and political differences arose but these were mainly dealt with in a way that - although quite difficult and time consuming at times - was not destabilising to the coalition as a whole. The dynamic in the OC was that power was skewed towards the larger organisations and at times one or two organisations were particularly forceful in their arguments. The power dynamic and membership of the OC also stemmed from the formation process, which meant that the campaign’s founders were centrally located in power structures. Groups who joined later had less of a voice.

The relationships between the OC and some working groups was regarded as less well-designed. The degree to which the relationship was strained depended - to a degree - on whether a working group had representation on the OC. Most working groups felt that they should have representation of some kind on the OC. Given the number of working groups this would not have been sustainable but perhaps reflects the fact that those without representation felt disempowered or disconnected from the power source of the OC. Working groups without a line into the OC were, however, described as “more functional” and generally performed better.
One key interlocutor said: “Working groups had a quite difficult working relationship with the OC. OC responsibilities on each area could have been better organised. Heads of working groups should have met at operational strategic planning level ... we could have done with a week-by-week communications calendar”. Another OC member admitted: “OC was never downward facing. The working group chairs (system) was too complicated ... It wasn’t clear who was doing what”. The G8 Leadership Working Group attracted comments about its relationship to the OC and in particular clarity of set up, decision-making and sign off. Those that commented on the OC relationship with the nations also described a disconnect at times.

Another common observation about the way that the OC was constituted related to the balance of skills and representation of functions. Core members of the OC were chosen on the basis of their organisational affiliation rather than through an attempt to build a suite of complementary expertise. In particular, while the OC had much relevant experience, it had (and suffered from) a relative lack of communications expertise, digital and media capability, understanding of mass public campaigning and knowledge of branding and advertising processes. There was also quite a significant staff turnover on the OC.

**Decision-making and ‘sign-off’**

The closely related sign-off and decision-making processes came up recurrently across the data set collected for this evaluation. Many of those outside the campaign’s decision-making structures were unclear about where sign-off was located and many described decisions being reopened repeatedly. One focus groups participant said: “One challenge was that groups didn’t know where decision-making happened and where sign-off was located.” For example on communications: “Some things fell between responsibilities, people weren’t given access to decisions and there was sometimes a vacuum”.

This sign-off complexity, some said, led to a chilling effect based on a perception of bureaucracy and lack of nimbleness of campaign management and delivery. The impact was that internal timelines were compromised which was described by one interviewee as “disruptive and stressful”. There was also a strong sense that decisions that had been made were sometimes undone. Also, related to this, was a belief that sometimes the process for reaching decisions was opaque and ad hoc. At times a long process was set up which frustrated people who wanted to act. At other times there seemed to be snap decisions, with very little process. One person close to the policy and advocacy work said: “Sometimes overkill of process and other times were none”. Another view was that the culture of some working group meetings was more about information sharing than decision-making.

One decision-making process that lacked clarity and transparency was ‘the Journey’. During the lead up to the G8 the campaign would travel across the country after the Big IF rally in London. The decision-making process to cancel this aspect of campaign was not clear to all, and some organisations were dismayed about this, having invested time in planning it. However others say it was simply due to budget constraints and point to the decision as an example of effective cost control decision-making.

Ultimately, many felt that the deficiency of trust between some members of the coalition was in part to blame for the lack of clear decision-making and lengthy sign-off processes. There is a sense, however, that over time the coalition in general, and the OC in particular, became more disciplined at decision-making and sign-off, as trust and confidence was built.

The OC reacted early to head off criticisms of the sign-off processes by instituting the Agile Sign-Off Group. This group also had challenges and in some instance took long periods to sign-off lines and outputs, while at other times it reportedly worked reasonably well. The group was said to have improved its decision-making over time and the final sign-off of the media statement at the G8 was, some said, testament to a slow building of common understanding.
Policy and Advocacy Working Group (PAG)

The Policy and Advocacy Working Group was the key gatekeeper of both policy lines and government relations. By and large it successfully delivered on these areas. There was a view however that the group was both very large and had too wide a brief. Some felt that splitting Policy and Advocacy Working Group into its policy and advocacy components would have been a better structure, so that each could more clearly fulfil its role. But there were also warnings about the dangers of over-compensating for these different views. One person close to the group’s work said: “The PAG was full of people who didn’t do the work ... I’m not sure we should have split PAG. But we should have had a lead on policy and a lead on advocacy – plus an overall lead. We can’t talk to government without closely cooperating [with policy people]”.

Public Engagement Working Group

One working group that, at times, struggled to be effective was the Public Engagement Working Group, which had the Supporter Journey, Creative Activity and Campaign Moment groups, among others, as part of its wide brief. The group struggled with its large mandate and became more functional when it had a more focused decision-making structure. One close to the group said: “It didn’t work ... [if had] too many groups and ended up being a talking shop. We tried to reconstitute it but didn’t have a mandate to get on with it. [There] should have been a toolkit for people – [they] got their act together at the end in a smaller group. The lessons [learned] were that you needed a smaller group of individuals and better project management”.

When the group worked well it did deliver and inspire a good range of activity: mobilising 45,000 people for Hyde Park; 550 letters and correspondence with MPs; high levels of innovative supporter activism across the country and specific working group events such as IF Fast and the diaspora events.

Nevertheless, these strong, imaginative campaigning actions came despite a number of key challenges. In particular, that there wasn’t sufficient lead-in time for public engagement staff within member organisations to build resources and capacity or to prioritise the work. This meant there wasn’t a clearly communicable role for supporters about how they might make a difference. “It felt like we were taking them (campaigns supporters) for granted... and that’s a huge risk” as one interviewee stated.

The nations

Campaigns in the nations – Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales - were up and running soon after the campaign plans were announced. The campaigns capitalised on the devolved opportunities opening up in the nations and were successful in their own right (see section 2.2) as well as multipliers of the central campaign aims and messages. The campaign provided an opportunity for organisations in the nations to engage their respective officials, journalists and politicians, which was a major benefit of the campaign. In Scotland and Wales, many campaign members were directly related or federated to English counterparts, whereas in Northern Ireland many of the members were not.

The campaign facilitated the nations, partly through budget allocations and partly through allowing a degree of flexibility in terms of messaging, communications and policy asks, especially later on in the campaign. Representatives of the nations were not members of the OC although they periodically fed into the OC by invitation and received OC emails.

However staff delivering the campaign in the nations unanimously felt that the central campaign could have done more to include them in decision-making and should have provided or allowed a range of bespoke materials. One key campaigner said: "It felt very driven by London, it felt like we were on the fringe. More money was available this time (compared to Make Poverty History) but it still felt like we got the crumbs off the London table. [In the end] it did go broadly well. We pulled it out of the fire a bit. There was no attempt to undermine us but we might have had a champion on the OC that was the voice of the nations... this is a key learning for future".

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Another interviewee emphasised the increasingly custom-built needs that campaigns need to have under devolution. “We are acutely aware [that] for campaigns to be successful in Scotland a campaign has to have Scottish-specific policy asks and a Scottish feel and identity and be nuanced in a Scottish fashion. It’s OK to push the UK-wide aspects but [you need to] also recognise and include Scottish specific asks.” Another said: “Lack of input [from the nations] into the strategy was not malicious but just not considered. ... There should be a filter at some stage that said: ‘have you thought about the impact on the nations?’ You shouldn’t talk about a UK campaign but a ‘four-nation’ approach... There was not an understanding of the Welsh and Scottish perspectives and politics. Media in Scotland is focused on the Scottish parliament. This doesn’t cross the mind of people [in London] and so we ended up in defensive position.”

Many in the nations also felt that the campaign should have continued in more than name at least until the official end date of 17 October. At one point there were discussions that the campaign would shut down earlier but there was a perceived lack of clarity of the rationale for this. This was reportedly problematic in the Scottish context in particular: “The message had already gone out. This risked undermining the reputation of the campaign with Scottish politicians.”

Finally, it should be noted that the IF campaign legacy for development campaigning in Northern Ireland was considerable. The united church service in Enniskillen brought together senior church leaders across several denominations in a highly unusual way, and the peaceful, family-friendly Belfast Big IF on 15 June had an impact both in terms of relationships and experience. The wider coalition and assembly meetings

The wider coalition (that is, those organisations – often smaller - not chairing working groups or in other decision-making positions in the campaign) were mainly positive about their involvement in the campaign. In particular, the latter period of the campaign was regarded by many as a time when the campaign’s increasingly impressive performance and impact was something that they were glad to be part of. In addition, the principle of solidarity and collaboration was appreciated by many, perhaps because it felt important to come together in the current social, economic and political context. One consequence of this was the sense in which the IF campaign helped build the campaigning capacity of its smaller members.

However, despite these positive aspects it is also apparent that the vertical decision-making model had issues. Firstly, more transparency on decision-making was needed and secondly, more space for opportunities to influence strategy, tactics and activities should have been created.

The assembly meetings were described as useful, well timed and well organised. The meetings inclined to be more about the sharing of information rather than a more horizontal, facilitated approach to decision-making. As one member reflected: “[It provided the] illusion of participation”, while another claimed that “there was an insufficient tolerance of dissent and discussion.” However, the assembly meetings were useful as a platform for exchanging ideas and in terms of hearing from the OC and working groups.

The role of Bond overall

Bond represented the cornerstone of the internal communication and organisation of the campaign, especially in terms of providing ongoing communication to the wider coalition. The closest thing the campaign had to an organisational centre or hub, Bond led on some of the key grants for the campaign as well as organising the assembly, internal communications and the monitoring, evaluation and learning aspects of the campaign. Staff members also chaired the Board and participated in many working groups. One of the wider coalition staff members reflected the general view of wider members. “Bond was pretty good [they had a] difficult role but they were crucial.”
International aspects

G8 capitals activity

It was decided early on in the planning stage that the campaign was going to be a UK campaign, based on the logic that at the outset of the campaign it was already too late to create a genuinely international coalition that was not imposed from the UK. Also, it is arguable that the G8 is no longer an important enough decision-making body around which to form a global campaign. This meant that at early stages in the campaign planning no significant strategy was brought forward to enable or urge key partners to contact their counterparts in other G8 capitals. However there is a strong submission in the evidence collected that many disagreed with this or changed their mind about the need for a clearer and more robust international strategy. Some activity did take place, for example the French-British government event on Transparency for Development (21 May 2013) and the Land Summit in Germany (June 2013). However, feedback from government suggests that while this was helpful as far as it went, there is a clear feeling that a bigger and more vigorous advocacy strategy would have enabled further and quicker progress to have been made at the G8, in particular on tax and transparency. The need for pressure in the G8 capitals – for example, in Berlin, Paris and Washington - is described by some both internally and externally (including in government) as a missed opportunity for an international campaign. Although most internal views argued that there was not enough time to build the appropriate capacity and infrastructure to effectively deliver this.

The global south

There were efforts by some to discuss bringing significant southern perspectives and voices into the campaign. These were limited, and certainly no major international campaign was ignited in the south, in part because of the decision early on to limit the campaign to the UK. During the campaign’s planning stages it was decided that the efficacy and practicalities of a significant southern based element meant it was something that would either have to be done comprehensively or not at all. However those who wanted a greater southern perspective and felt that a bigger southern element would have added value to the campaign, felt that the degree of southern participation was too limited. It was also noted that a southern perspective is not just about speakers from the global south at IF events, but that southern voices should be centrally involved in shaping the campaign - its policy asks and its framing in particular - from the outset.

Commensurate with the above, there seems to have been little involvement by the country programmes of the member international NGOs, in the south. This aspect was not built into the campaign but may have therefore carried a risk of shallow representation and accountability in terms of presenting the campaign to decision makers. The campaign would also have had an impact in various countries in the south, which was mentioned as another reason for building wider representation, ownership and participation.

Planning

The leading organisations within the campaign had, by the end of 2012, a discussed and agreed set of interlinked and separate plans covering activities and built around the three key ‘moments’ of the campaign launch, the 2013 Budget, the G8 and its build up. Most elements were delivered on time despite significant pressures of time and working in a large coalition.

However, plans suffered from not being fully understood by important groups at key times. This was in part reportedly because of a lack of information flow but also because decision and plans were frequently delayed or re-considered. As mentioned above, planning suffered also from the ‘loose-tight’ model. Early stages of the campaign planning had been disrupted to some degree by the delays in agreeing the policy platform and finalising the coalition membership and framing of the campaign.

An additional but understandable limitation was that there seems to have been insufficient appetite and capacity to reflect on the plans and strategies and the extent to which objectives were likely to be reached. It would have been useful to integrate a series of planning review phases into the planning at the outset and consider how expert opinion within the campaign coalition could inform these discussions and potential adaptation. However there were key moments for reflection built in, including OC away days and a mid-term review.
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**Internal communications**

In general, the campaign had reasonably good levels of internal communication about what was happening and what had happened – in terms of outputs and activities – emanating mainly from Bond. Many respondents spoke highly of Bond’s role in this regard. This was highly dependent on a very small number of key people. Overall the need for greater capacity in the form of more dedicated resources at a centralised level was a common request.

For some in the wider coalition there was too much information and this made it difficult to know what to focus on. This was a consequence of the campaign’s lack of focus and an attempt to deliver a high number of activities in a relatively short period of time.

Some in the wider coalition and among working group chairs felt that there was a lack of information at a strategic level, particularly from the OC. More detail not just about the decisions taken, but the rationale for them and their likely external effect, would have been widely appreciated.

It was also suggested that the internal communications were designed/suitable for larger organisations with significant resources and it was a struggle for smaller organisations or those with a more peripheral engagement to keep up with the emails and who would have benefitted from targeted communications and a “if you can only do one thing...” approach.

**Transition**

One of clearest lessons that came out of the Make Poverty History experience was that supporters were allowed to ‘fall off a cliff’; in other words, their energy, momentum and - in some cases - names were not captured by the sector for the future. To ensure this didn’t happen, the IF campaign set up a supporter transition process for supporters to sign up for campaigning in one of the many campaigning organisations that were members of IF.

The mechanism was well designed and technically worked well. However many felt that the gap between the activity around the G8 and follow-up process in the autumn was too long and that the energy and momentum was not captured. This finding was corroborated by the conversion rate of fewer than 10% of non-affiliated new supporters in the supporter transition process. It was meant to transition better but we didn’t learn the lesson of Make Poverty History, said one close to the operational aspects of transition. Another said: “There is an argument for the transition starting sooner. A better exit strategy was needed.”

More widely, there was a feeling in the coalition that not only had the supporter transition process itself not kept up the momentum but the idea that, and possible implications of, a brand like IF being built up and then abandoned was an inconsistent strategy: “Not sure enough thinking went to how you build a brand and then ditch it”, was one typical comment.

**The ‘fourth moment’**

The original campaign plan was to have a fourth moment in the autumn to end the campaign on a high note. There was a widespread commitment led by those organisations pushing for the nutrition/food element to be more visible, to strongly link some campaigning action to International Day for the Eradication of Poverty on Thursday 17 October 2013.

While those close the centre of power in the campaign accepted the rationale behind the decision to not have this ‘fourth moment’ - essentially that there wasn’t a meaningful political opportunity beyond the summer to justify sustained and significant campaign activity - there were views that this might be detrimental to supporters’ understanding of the campaign trajectory. National campaigners also wanted to see the campaign continue and many felt that after the G8 ended the signs of the campaign closing and moving to a transition phase were premature.
3.5. Other aspects: Value for money, gender and learning

This section looks at other aspects of the campaign including assessing value for money and levels of resourcing, gender and learning.

Resource availability, allocation and value for money

Overall, the financial input by donors and coalition members along with in-kind contributions has led to a number of important outcomes both in terms of funding and policy changes. Evaluation strongly indicates a high-level of return on investment and good value for money.

Contributions to the campaign came from individuals, church groups, local organisations, international NGOs, cooperatives and foundations. The total funding envelope supplemented by the in-kind staff time of the coalition membership was comparable with other previous large scale campaigns, such as Make Poverty History. The general feeling amongst interviewees was that most activities that needed to happen, or were planned to, were given a reasonable budget. However the spending on marketing and advertising was reportedly lower than, for instance, that of the Make Poverty History campaign.

There was a good logical correlation between the income and size of international NGOs and the expectation placed upon them in terms of financial contribution to the campaign. In addition to making a contribution to direct costs, the understanding was that organisations were expected to allocate up to 50% of their campaigns’ team time in order to try and provide sufficient resources, human, financial and political to meet campaign objectives.

Nevertheless, the commitment of staff time to the campaign seemed to be variable across the coalition, especially between the ‘moments’. A significant burden of work fell on too few people and this created difficulties both in terms of delivery and expectations: “The workload didn’t always appear to be shared as well as it might,” one key informant reflected.

In addition, it may be important to reflect on whether organisational commitment throughout the campaign and not just at the key moments, was sufficient to reach the ambitious objectives: “I’m glad we were ambitious, but we were too ambitious. [In the end] resources didn’t match ambition. That’s not just about money but organisational priorities, it’s about staff time and resource”. If campaign coalition members asserted that they “were mindful throughout that donated funds should be used shrewdly to secure the biggest impact and best results in line with our joint aims”. However, there were some legitimate concerns at the higher levels of the coalition about the campaign’s lack of financial controls. This manifested itself in two ways, firstly on the income side, in terms of the unrealistic ambition of generating income within a tight economic context, for example through the difficulties in securing wristband distribution: “Suppliers etc. get asked more than they used to so we had to spend more money [on] things than [we] used to”. And secondly with regard to campaign expenditure: “It wasn’t always clear whether the decisions about what to invest money in and when [had been] made at the appropriate level.”

One reason for this is that the lack of a coherent, focused change theory meant that in the end many strategies, activities and campaign tools were implemented. Indeed it has been difficult to identify very many campaign activities between January and June that were not implemented, based on an open discussion and informed decision – at OC or working group levels – through a robust analysis of assumed effectiveness or value for money. One notable exception is the Journey (see below).
An assessment of value for money in advocacy can be usefully informed by looking at the relationship between inputs and outputs as an assessment of ‘efficiency’. The assumptions in the relationship between outputs and outcomes as advocacy ‘effectiveness’ mean the campaign can in conceptual terms be retrospectively assessed using outcomes against inputs as a proxy for ‘value for money’.

On this basis, the financial input along with in-kind input has led - according to analysis supported here - to a number of important outcomes both in terms of funding and policy changes, including over $4 billion of global nutrition funding commitments; a commitment to spending 0.7% of UK national income on development and policies endorsed by the UK government and the G8 – on tax for instance – that make the greater resources availability for development more likely. While relatively few of these commitments can be entirely attributed to the IF campaign, many of the commitments are unlikely to have happened as quickly, robustly or publically as they have without the IF campaign’s advocacy and related public pressure. This strongly indicates a high-level of return on investment and represents good value for money.

Furthermore, there is, anecdotally, support amongst the public, and in particular backing amongst supporters of the sector, for organisations to work together and cooperate and collaborate more, especially on campaigns. This is supported by the Supporters Survey, in which many respondents talked about the importance and effectiveness of coalition campaigns in general, and the IF campaign specifically.

One interviewee from the coalition said: “For us it’s about the outcome for children … there is no certain way of measuring that but the four billion dollars pledge was certainly worth it … feels like exceptionally good value, and good value for money in terms of outcomes achieved. We might have had 0.7% but there would have been all sorts of caveats and it might not have been as sustainable. The extra aid and the extra pledges … all the financial pledges are a bonus.” While another said “The coalition itself – the combined weight and brand - is worth more than the sum of its parts”.

However at the next level down, in terms of the detail of how value was assessed in the campaign and a sense of what constituted value in terms of the measures of success and the line-by-line spend set against certain activities and their contribution to outcomes, the picture is less convincing. While the OC had strategic oversight of the budget and resource allocation, there was not always full discussion on whether funding decisions followed strategic, operational and tactical imperatives with full knowledge of those accountable.

For example, one spending decision that was questioned by quite a number of participants as overly costly, especially in terms of human resources, was the ‘spinning flowers’ activity at the Hyde Park event. The flowers were expensive and the activity became particularly time-consuming and seemed to take a lot of key staff’s capacity at a crucial time. The added value to the campaign was judged by some to be likely to be minimal. However, other aspects of the campaign that were too expensive given the budget envelope – such as the Journey – were cancelled. One area that some internal interviewees and focus group participants were keen to look at in terms of value for money and future endowment for building capacity was the lack of strategic investment in local campaigning and activism. One said: “If they had one more [thing they could have done] it would be to build a movement to carry on by itself ... more money should have been invested in local campaigning, which would have been better value for money”.

**Fundraising**

Fundraising responsibility was only loosely owned by working groups, apart from the Fundraising Working Group. This meant that there was a disconnect between working groups and the Fundraising Working Group in terms of an understanding of specific project plans, communicating donor engagement plans (held by the Fundraising Working Group) and ascertaining if working groups had potential donor contacts who could be approached for funding.
Timing was also a big issue. The group was only fully formed five months before the start of the campaign. The most successful fundraising came from donor engagement led by members of the OC which started more than a year before the campaign started and secured a significant grant for the campaign.

Gender

The evaluation interviews included some enquiries on gender although this was not supported by enquiries in the survey or elsewhere in the data sets. Most interviewees who were asked about gender aspects of the campaign seemed surprised by the questions but most agreed it could have come out a bit more in the messaging of the campaign, as well as through some of the policy messages. Typical comments were: “It would have been an interesting angle [but it] wasn’t a communications priority” and “It wasn’t [highlighted] but it could have pushed more about women... in the simpler messaging”.

In terms of decision-making, when enquiries were made about the gender balance, one comment was: “There were probably a few really key men ... who were the top dogs but also [some strong women]. Maybe right at the top we could have done with more [women]”.

Learning

Learning in the campaign

The overall purpose of the monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) component of the IF campaign was to ensure that the campaign was monitored and evaluated properly and that the lessons identified in these processes – and earlier international NGO coalition campaigns - were learnt by the broader sector. The objectives of this work were:

- To monitor the campaign as it ran against its measures of success for communication to the coalition and to feed into this evaluation
- To commission and manage the process of an external evaluation which will amalgamate all monitoring data and conduct further consultation to establish our achievements (outcomes and impact) and explore the reasons for our successes and lack thereof where relevant
- To take steps to ensure that the wider campaigning sector learns the lessons from the evaluation and monitoring processes

In addition to this was a commitment to sharing – and acting upon - the learning from other coalition campaigns, especially Make Poverty History and Jubilee 2000. This programme of MEL work had logical content and excellent intent and generated significant monitoring and campaign management information (for example, the evaluators were presented with over 1,000 pages of monitoring information, mostly quantitative).

The campaign had thought about the MEL process. This included:

- A mid-campaign internal evaluation
- A scorecard, which summarised progress against measures of success, was regularly shared with the Board, OC and at assembly meetings
- An OC ‘away day’ in April that reviewed progress to date and in which proposals for course corrections were made
However, it seems that despite this, there was an insufficient formal, systematic process of integration of this learning into the work of the OC and key working groups. A consequence of this was that feedback loops and accountability mechanisms were not always in place, mainly due to an understandable lack of time.

The space for reflection and adjustment of campaign strategy – in particular on public engagement objectives – were often squeezed and there was limited time and interest in this because of a preoccupation with operational delivery. A systematic approach was never established and therefore the process for sharing learning and adapting strategies and tactics was rather limited.

To compound this, it seems there was very little evidence of sharing of good practice in coalition campaigning, even from the larger NGOs who have a strong history and considerable experience in working in campaigning coalitions, networks and alliances (the Global Campaign for Education, Global Health networks, various General Election inter-agency ‘campaigns’, etc.)

For the wider coalition, as tends to be the case for those listed above, it seems that their main forum – the IF campaign assemblies - tended to be inclined towards a culture of ‘update and celebrate’, rather than ‘reflect and learn’ and these were possibly missed opportunities for acting as a wider spot-check on progress and inviting coalition members into a safe space to critique strategies and activities.

Embedding learning from the evaluation

The campaign formation, development and discussions indicate that an ongoing campaigning capacity building programme for the international NGO sector is required. This evaluation and its findings and recommendations are a key component. Through further testing and discussion the priority capacity building elements could be drawn out. For example, the governance of campaign coalitions, the role of CEOs in campaigns, the importance of understanding of power dynamics, political education programmes, how to maximise social media and digital, etc.

Among the ideas presented were that findings and lessons from previous campaigns presented “in person” work best as part of a more bespoke campaigning capacity needs assessment. Also there was a desire amongst some to engender a more continuous process, including coming together soon to develop the next initiative from the ground up. One comment was; “As many versions of the product as possible: serious report, a summary, bullet point version, popular version, 10 key recommendations … We should insist that through the different channels – each of the major agencies should have their own session to digest it”.

The work on embedding learning will be a key area for Bond and member organisations, in particular those international NGOs at the heart of the IF campaign - and indeed other campaign coalitions on the environment, health, trade, tax, food and so forth - to take forward as a key aspect of the ongoing MEL work and campaign legacy resources.
LESSONS & RECOMMENDATIONS
LESSONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

The IF campaign has been the latest in a string of large-scale development coalition campaigns aimed at mobilising large sections of the public and aimed at bringing about policy change. Campaigning and advocacy coalitions are popular with the public and politicians, but it is important that specific lessons are taken forward by key actors and shared with wider civil society groups to ensure future coalitions perform to the best of their ability.

The lessons and recommendations for future coalitions stemming from IF are limited by two key factors:

1. The degree to which the findings and learnings from the campaign are replicable or likely to be replicable in future coalition campaign
2. How similar to the IF campaign any future campaign is likely to be in terms of structure, ambition, scope and target

These recommendations will underpin future resources for sector learning as outlined by the campaign and taken forward by Bond, their member organisations and other IF campaign coalition members. It is important that these lessons and recommendations are taken forward by key groups – including internally within the major international NGOs - and not left exclusively to networks to deliver.

4.1. Lessons and recommendations for future coalition campaigns

Policy and strategy lessons and recommendations

The IF campaign has managed to achieve key areas of policy progress and high level political access, as well as increased campaigning capacity in the sector. The campaign helpfully builds on a number of key learnings from other campaigns and draws on the considerable expertise of coalition members and their staff.

In particular, the campaign was good at adapting to changing policy and political opportunities including allowing an increase in ambition in the measures of success set for policy change in key areas (especially on the changing context on the tax agenda). Future coalitions should commit to examining the possibilities of upgrading (or downgrading) policy success measures and targets as appropriate responses to the changing external policy and political context. The campaign also had a well-connected and targeted, very professional and technically competent lobbying arm – in Whitehall, Westminster and constituencies - which has set high standards for coalition lobbying.

The campaign was adept at times at capturing the synergies between strategic media, policy and advocacy work. The sector already has excellent assets in the form of political and media contacts, which the IF campaign harnessed to good effect, through key coalition members rightly putting organisational interests to one side in favour of the campaign. Future campaigns should consider whether this potentially powerful combination is the key method for bringing about the change sought by the campaign.

Recommendation 1.
This campaign was in part based on an analysis of external political opportunity, in particular the UK chairing of the G8 in 2013. However, the need for a broader analysis was not always given primacy in the ongoing strategy process and discussions, which at times seemed more driven by the need to broker compromise. A sober assessment of political and policy opportunities, married with an honest appraisal of coalition potential, should drive the purpose and objectives of major coalition campaigns in future.

Recommendation 2.
Differences around defining the main purpose and key objectives of the campaign derived from the different, and at times competing, theories of change operating across the coalition. While recognising the fundamental challenges and complexity of doing this while building broad, diverse coalitions, it nevertheless merited more fundamental exploration, leading - ideally - to more strategic clarity of purpose as well as a deeper understanding of the consequences of the differing theories of change.

Recommendation 3.
It is very useful for coalition campaigns, as the IF campaign did, to have key measures of success in place that help inform and guide both strategies and tactics. It is important that measures of success are realistically set, prioritised, with clear assumptions, linked to a clear theory of change, and further supplemented by audience and supporter research and insights. Such measures should be reformatted or recalibrated as necessary at key points for reflection, based on an assessment of monitoring data and ongoing power analysis.
LESONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 4.
In a coalition campaign which targets similar international institutions, groups of states or global bodies, consider undertaking a more comprehensive international strategy working more comprehensively in the key, targeted, influential capital cities to utilise coalition members’ organisational reach to apply international pressure in support of the policy changes sought, taking into account the need for adequate time, resources and openness to genuine partnership that this would require.

Recommendation 5.
COalition diversity was strong in some areas, notably the faith and diaspora organisations and there was a good range of sizes of organisations. This indicated the appetite present for cooperation, partnerships and campaign coalitions. However, the ability to achieve ambitious public mobilisation objectives was compromised by the lack of participation of most environmental organisations and mass membership organisations such as trade unions. Future coalitions should consider strategies to include these groups at an earlier stage in order to achieve buy in and increase options for mobilisation and greater potential political influence.

Recommendation 6.
The IF campaign’s policy baskets lacked prioritisation and coherence. Future coalition campaigns should consider the consistency of policies, their interconnectedness, the number of asks and their achievability, their complexity, and their relevance to the overall framing of the campaign.

Recommendation 7.
Future coalitions should carefully consider whether policy and advocacy (government relations) should be closely tied together in one group or structure or whether a looser model of cooperation between these two disciplines should be employed.

Structure, management and campaign culture lessons and recommendations
When the sector comes together in coalitions such as IF, the process and activity often helps increase professional campaigns capacity which is particularly important for smaller and medium sized NGOs. The sharing of expertise and mutual understanding and learning that this offers is something that future coalition campaigns should prioritise. In the meantime the synergies and connections made at a professional level should be fostered and supported by organisations large and small.

The campaign has allowed creativity to flourish in key areas such as schools and youth and has had a meaningful and more inclusive engagement with diaspora groups. Future coalition campaigns should build on these linkages and further encourage innovation and creativity.

Recommendation 8.
As recognised in the formation assessment, the start of the campaign suffered from a model of leadership and management and a campaign culture which was perceived as too ‘top-down’. Although there are mitigating circumstances for this – the time available, diversity and the need for disciplined communications to support the lobby effort - coalitions tend to work best when members and staff at all levels feel empowered to take action, understand the strategic imperatives and play a meaningful part in decision-making. While elements of leadership and control may be necessary in large and diverse coalitions, future campaign coalitions should consider a flatter management structure and a more diffuse and empowered operational decision-making, with clearer opportunities for the wider coalition to understand the rationale of and, at times, feed into, strategic decision-making.

Recommendation 9.
The ‘loose-tight’ strategy – coming together in a disciplined way for short periods in the campaign followed by periods of freer, individual action – did not work well in the IF campaign and led to periods of lost momentum. While such a strategy could work, it would need a clearer and more robust set of commitments by individuals and groups of partners and a more empowering campaign culture to ensure activity continued during the looser periods.
Recommendation 10.
The core campaign management team should reflect the appropriate balance of complementary skills to deliver a coalition campaign. This does not need to be at the expense of balanced organisational representation, since this can be achieved via a campaign governance structure and/or strengthened more formal assembly structure. The functional operational decision-making aspects of the campaign would have benefited from greater representation of key working groups on the central coordination function of the campaign.

Recommendation 11.
One aspect of the model employed that resulted in challenges was the campaign sign-off processes, which, although they improved as the campaign went along, caused frustration and delay. Tighter, lighter and clearer sign-off processes should be planned for future coalition campaigns, with opportunities to reflect on the efficacy of the process and adjust as necessary.

Recommendation 12.
The campaign planning was delayed by various elements and disagreements, including in the early stages of the campaign. Campaigns of this magnitude need longer timelines in order to maximise the potential of the delivered elements and minimise organisational impacts on both large and small organisations.

Recommendation 13.
A larger core team providing dedicated capacity would have provided a clearer campaign ‘hub’ which would have assisted this campaign in managing and organising key aspects of campaign delivery on time and with less impact on the coalition members. Future campaigns should consider employing a core team to coordinate aspects of the campaign delivery, in ways which support and do not undermine the collective spirit of shared delivery by campaign partners.

Recommendation 14.
The timing of the campaign also needs to engage key groups such as faith groups, private sector bodies and diaspora organisations earlier on, so as to maximise the potential of their participation. Such partners should be involved in the conception and planning of coalition campaign as far as possible.

Recommendation 15.
Moreover, one of the key positive legacies of the IF campaign has been the appetite and commitment for greater cooperation among communities of interest, for example strengthening groupings for the longer-term work on tax and diaspora participation, among others. Resources and capacity should be put in place to support and maintain the momentum for this.

Recommendation 16.
There should be a credible and open assessment of corporate partnerships which should be conducted early on in the campaign planning stages. The strategy for corporate partnerships should be fully aligned with the objectives and central strategy for the campaign. This would require a risk assessment of how the campaign’s objectives and effectiveness could be compromised (as well as how the corporate relationship could be affected).

Recommendation 17.
Future coalitions should consider embedding fundraising into other key working groups, and consider assigning a representative from a fundraising working group to other working groups to support on fundraising. In the run up to future coalitions, fundraisers in key agencies could form an informal working group as campaign plans are starting to be discussed and initiate conversations with key donors to ensure that there is time to get donors interested in the campaign.

Mobilisation, messaging and communications lessons and recommendations

The campaign had a strong commitment to innovation and the testing of new strategies and activities, particularly on the digital side. Coalitions are often a key way in which the boundaries of these new campaigning techniques can be tested and this is especially important for smaller and medium sized NGOs. The IF campaign tested important elements in this regard.
**Recommendation 18.**

If a reframing of discourse is sought, it will be important in future coalition campaigns to ensure a stronger theory of change where there is a complementary, integrated relationship between mobilisation, communications and messaging contributing to policy and political objectives. A stronger rationale for investing in (or deciding not to invest in) large-scale resources aimed at mass mobilisation and awareness-raising is implied by this.

**Recommendation 19.**

The IF campaign recognised that supporters needed to be taken on a journey. However, supporter engagement, energy and mobilisation built to a peak in June and then the momentum created by the campaign dissipated quickly, despite efforts via the supporter transition plan to ensure that supporters didn’t ‘fall off a cliff’. Future campaigns must ensure that momentump is captured in a more strategic way and that the gap between the ‘high point’ of the campaign and any transitional stage is less drawn out, and more seamlessly captured. A clearer exit strategy is needed to deal with the heightened interest of parliamentarians, ministers, the media and other key decision-makers and opinion-formers.

**Recommendation 20.**

Partly as a result of the context, the IF campaign didn’t manage to mobilise large sections of the UK public in the way that Make Poverty History or Jubilee 2000 did. In some ways the ability of the IF campaign to command government airtime and help set the agenda of the G8 rested partly on the historical reputation and ‘implied threat’ of the sector as a top mobiliser. The IF campaign managed to maintain some of that threat but possibly not all of it. The implication of this could be that the international NGO sector may no longer be able to assume it carries a plausible threat of representing substantial public mobilisation in favour of international development and global poverty eradication. Communicating this ‘threat’ to policy makers will need to be used with care in the future. Considering the increasing importance of online campaigning, the sector should seek to further build campaigning in various ways include through further capacity building programmes. Future campaigns will also need to consider whether a longer running, more sustained set of messages used to reframe the debate on aid and development would be a useful and realistic response.

**Recommendation 21.**

Despite strong efforts to present the campaign and its policy baskets in interesting and comprehensible ways, the policy platform of the campaign lacked coherence and was hard to communicate. The process to decide on policy asks should contain a professional assessment from a communications point of view, to ensure that the public-facing elements of the campaign can be communicated effectively.

**Recommendation 22.**

Southern voices were present in the campaign at key times but sporadically. Future campaigns should ensure that more prominent southern perspectives are included in the campaign message delivery and in shaping the campaign and ensuring that it has some rootedness in and connectedness to campaigning and campaigners in the global south, drawing on field experience and the emerging ‘one programme approaches’ that many international NGOs are adopting.

**Recommendation 23.**

A UK-wide coalition will tend to work better if there is serious acknowledgement from the start that the political, campaigning, NGO and media landscapes are fundamentally different in the various UK nations. To avoid being too London-centric in future campaigns, it should be more clearly recognised that UK-wide campaigns have particular and specific communications needs in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales, and that a separate set of locally conducted analyses and a devolved set of resources should be in place from the start.
Recommendation 24.
It is apparent that the particular lessons that each new coalition campaign brings are not always agreed upon, owned or shared and often not systematically harvested and reintegrated. It is important therefore that lessons from previous efforts should be more formally harvested and reintroduced at the beginning of fresh deliberations.

Recommendation 25.
There is a sense that the existing sector infrastructure of meetings and groups did not work, either for those who were participating in these meetings or groups or those who wanted to design a bespoke campaign and build a new coalition. The lesson is that sector infrastructure is difficult to design in a way that would fit all situations. ‘Heavy lifting-style’ infrastructure, that could facilitate the building of a coalition at scale, would be inappropriate and potentially expensive. Therefore more flexible sector infrastructure should be built, which can radically scale up or down according to circumstances, opportunity and interest. However, while this infrastructure could be built in accordance with wider sector wishes, it would take an explicit agreement with BOAG agencies to make it work.

Recommendation 26.
There is a general acceptance of the need for an appropriate and sensible leadership group to emerge when necessary. This would imply a small group, with clarity of purpose and a confluence of aims. This is likely, at least in the medium term, to include BOAG agencies (especially in a large-scale coalition) but should not preclude other groups with key competencies, mobilisation abilities, access to information or skills and international connections, as well as relevant networks and alliances.

Recommendation 27.
Another key learning is that clearer communications at an early stage from the core inception group to a broader group of organisations would have helped allay tensions and reservations later on. More and wider informal sectoral discussions could have happened without significantly jeopardising the central negotiations. This communication must be balanced against the need to retain a sensible measure of control over the process. In this regard, the presence of a trusted interlocutor, an ‘honest broker’ - most likely a senior Bond member of staff, mandated by the sector - in key meetings, as a two-way conduit for the rest of the sector would have helped allay early tensions and build trust. For many organisations, a dialogue with government at an early stage is both inevitable and desirable. Again, actors need to ensure that intelligence is fed back and shared, and that any assurances given are limited within a given mandate.

Recommendation 28.
Such a leadership process would also need to have a degree of porosity in terms of information sharing and clarity of process, to include clear timelines and decision-making points. While it is accepted that some informal discussions will always happen, the point at which they move towards more formal discussions, with meetings and agendas is the point at which such processes might be triggered. This campaign has suffered from not having a clear inception-planning timeline. A major coalition must start discussions, negotiations and planning earlier and be more disciplined about timelines and decision-making points.

Recommendation 29.
The breadth of the coalition should follow the campaign proposition and purpose. If the campaign is proposed to be about broadening links with other sectors and changing the framing of an idea, then discussions with the key relevant parties should be in place from the beginning.
“Flexible sector infrastructure should be built, which can radically scale up or down according to circumstances, opportunity and interest.”
The ‘G8 leaders’ on boats stunt, near Enniskillen. June 2013.

Credit: Andrew Aitchison
Annex 1: Campaign organogram

Monthly Assembly Meetings – open to all current & prospective member organisations
ANNEXES

Agile Sign-off Group

Policy & Advocacy

Fundraising

Monitoring, Evaluation & Learning

International

Data

Parliamentary

Campaign Moments
1. Launch
2. Budget
3. G8

Scotland

Wales

Northern Ireland
Annex 2: Measures of success

Joint Campaign 2013 Measures of Success April 2013

The Objectives of the Joint Campaign on Food and Hunger are:

- Specific policy progress to achieve a sustainable food system and tackle hunger
- To build massive public support for action to achieve these goals by deepening understanding of poverty and development, the environment, and the need for structural change

Key measures of success

1. Policy aims achieved

i. Specific policy goals (and/or progress towards them) based on agreed OC measures of what progress looks like (including UK government commitment to spend 0.7% of GNI on aid by 2013 delivered and legislation that this target level is maintained post-2013 secured).

ii. Cross party support sustained and built on with an identifiable critical mass of MPs actively supporting and promoting international development

2. Support increased among UK public for international development and the environment

i. Increased media coverage/prevalence of development and environment process and progress stories

ii. Breadth of support increased including the engagement of new un-reached supporters

- Raised awareness of the campaign among 15-20 million of the UK public as ‘onlookers’/ no. of UK adults who will have heightened awareness of the campaign’s issues and watch our events

- Engaged 3-5 million of the UK’s public as ‘endorsers’ / no. of UK adults who will take action in support of the campaign

- Engaged 500,000 from the above total as ‘advocates’ of the campaign (those using personal networks, recruit public to join with data-driven relationship with coalition and at least one member)

iii. New supporters recruited to our organisations

iv. Public awareness and media coverage at the level of Make Poverty History (87%)

3. Better understanding among a sector of the public of the structural causes of food insecurity and hunger and of the impacts on the natural world caused by food production and consumption

i. Politicians talk about structural issues not just aid

ii. Increased media coverage of structural causes of hunger, malnutrition and environmental degradation

iii. Depth of support increased / no. of people moving up the engagement pyramid

iv. Shifts in discourse and increased salience for our issues

v. Public understanding: At least 500,000 members of the UK public have better understanding of the structural causes of food insecurity and hunger and their commitment to tackling global poverty issues increases.
4. UK public mobilised and engaged
   i. Number of direct actions taken and type of activity
   ii. Deeper public engagement evidenced by supporters able to activate more ‘assets’ across voice, relationships, creative ability, expertise and material resource with a focus on creating more depth amongst our existing supporter base.
   iii. Coalition members engage with the lifestyle ask area of work and as a result, campaign endorsers show their support for lifestyle change.

5. Sector and movement strengthened with new capabilities to work post campaign improved
   i. Number and diversity of organisations involved in the campaign (formal membership and informal support), their levels of action and satisfaction from participation (eg, with joint activities / levels of information sharing /decision-making etc.)
   ii. Organisations from the membership report that involvement in the joint campaign/partnership has strengthened their ability to undertake campaigning and/or public engagement including in existing/new alliance(s)
   iii. The underlying national civil society campaigning platform on development is stronger and working together continues post joint campaign with ongoing strategy and resource sharing.

6. Global support for campaign aims achieved
   i. Involvement of non-UK national and international NGOs and networks
   ii. Southern participation in the campaign
   iii. Strong participation in the Global Day of Action to show solidarity for the cause in target countries
### Annex 3: IF campaign monitoring log

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Means of verification</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>End of campaign target</th>
<th>Final result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Policy aims achieved</td>
<td>Specific policy goals achieved</td>
<td>Evidence that our aspirations are achieved</td>
<td>Analysis of public positions of MPs (including PQs, votes, input into debates etc.)</td>
<td>From Policy and Advocacy Working Group</td>
<td>Further detail in Policy and Advocacy Working Group documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cross party/MP support</td>
<td>Continued support for development from the 3 main political parties</td>
<td>Analysis of public positions of MPs (including PQs, votes, input into debates etc.)</td>
<td>Attendees at launch event</td>
<td>Increased positivity on our issues</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 2. Support increased among UK public for international development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media coverage</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Means of verification</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>End of campaign target</th>
<th>Final result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quality/content of coverage of IF as assessed through an external media evaluation</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>89% of coverage is favourable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Assessment of the broader development coverage throughout the life of IF</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Data not available</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Breadth of support</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Onlookers</td>
<td>No. of UK adults with a better understanding of structural causes of food insecurity and hunger</td>
<td>Tracker panel [No. of times onlookers name non-structural issues as cause of hunger]</td>
<td>67.6 million</td>
<td>Reduction from baseline</td>
<td>200,000 less people mentioned non-structural issues as cause of hunger between launch and March.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## ANNEXES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Means of verification</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>End of campaign target</th>
<th>Final result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Endorsers</strong></td>
<td>No. of UK adults who take action in support of the campaign</td>
<td>Online (1) Sign-ups on IF website</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 million [TOTAL 3-5 million]</td>
<td>101,058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Online (2) Sign-ups to IF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18,318 (through member organisations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Offline (1) Wristband purchasing figures</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1-2 million [TOTAL 3-5 million]</td>
<td>95,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Offline (2) No. of offline actions taken</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1-2 million [TOTAL 3-5 million]</td>
<td>147,559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Advocates</strong></td>
<td>No. of people tweeting</td>
<td>IF Twitter analysis</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>99,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Offline (1) No. of people requesting for more materials (postcards etc.)</td>
<td>Individual organisational records</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>34,633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Offline (2) No. of attendees at IF events (training etc.)</td>
<td>Individual organisational records</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11,535</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qualitative evidence of supporters able to activate more ‘assets’ across voice, relationships, creative ability, expertise and material resources with a focus on creating more depth amongst our existing supporter base</td>
<td>Case study examples (from individual organisations)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>30 stories</td>
<td>18 case studies gathered</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Annex 3: IF campaign monitoring log

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Means of verification</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>End of campaign target</th>
<th>Final result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New supporters</td>
<td>% increase in supporters of member organisations</td>
<td>Member submission of figures</td>
<td>20% increase on baseline</td>
<td></td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conversion rate of 'neutral supporters'</td>
<td>Member submission of figures</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Undefined</td>
<td>Under 10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Public awareness**

| Brand awareness         | % of the general public that say they are aware of the IF campaign       | Tracker panel [% of UK public aware of IF and % of UK public aware of the content of IF] | 0 | 87% | 10.5% of people were aware of IF (unprompted) |

**3. Better understanding of the structural causes of food insecurity and hunger**

**Political voices**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Politicians talk about structural problems not just aid</th>
<th>Evidence of changes in focus from aid to structural issues</th>
<th>Analysis of public positions of MPs (PQs, votes, input into debates etc.)</th>
<th>Based on analysis of key documents</th>
<th>Shift towards a focus on structural issues</th>
<th>Data not available</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Media coverage of structural issues</td>
<td>Increased media coverage of structural causes of hunger, malnutrition and environmental degradation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>On over 65% of the IF media coverage the campaign's key messages are fully conveyed, increasing the media coverage of structural causes of hunger.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depth of support increased</td>
<td>No. of people taking multiple online actions throughout the campaign</td>
<td>Database and survey question</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Approximately 20K (15%) of the supporters took multiple online actions. 33% of organisations report an increase in the depth of support throughout the IF campaign</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### ANNEXES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Means of verification</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>End of campaign target</th>
<th>Final result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shifts in discourse and increased salience of our issues</td>
<td>Discourse analysis</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Data not available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4. UK public mobilised and engaged

#### Public action

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reach of launch event communication</th>
<th>No. of people reached by launch event communications</th>
<th>No. of email recipients</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>500,000</th>
<th>1 million</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reach of launch events</td>
<td>No. of people at launch event(s) enabled to be multipliers of the campaign</td>
<td>No. of event attendees</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>3,000+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Budget actions</td>
<td>Online No. of emails to MPs</td>
<td>Database</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>25,820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Offline (1) No. of people registered to lobby their MP</td>
<td>Database</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18,364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Offline (2) No. of letters sent to George Osborne (by public)</td>
<td>Mailroom of the Treasury reports</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-G8 actions</td>
<td>Online No. of actions taken calling for action by world leaders</td>
<td>No. of online tax actions taken</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>4,117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attendees at public event re. G8</td>
<td>No. of people attending public G8 event</td>
<td>No. of people at the Big IFs (London + Belfast)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>48,000 crowd estimate (amalgamated London and Belfast)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Annex 3: IF campaign monitoring log

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Means of verification</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Final result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lifestyle changes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition engages with the lifestyle work</td>
<td>No. of organisations requesting lifestyle resources</td>
<td>Lifestyle Working Group records</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9 organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporters engage with the lifestyle work</td>
<td>Reach of digital FT14 work (no. of people reached through twitter and Facebook on 25 Feb)</td>
<td>No. of views of lifestyle page on 25/2/13</td>
<td>Page views on 22/2/13 was 29</td>
<td>Above average 128 visits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of hits on lifestyle ask page on IF website</td>
<td>Google analytics</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4,366</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 5. Sector and movement strengthened with new capabilities to work post campaign improved

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number and diversity of organisations involved in the campaign</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of coalition members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity (geography, faith, size, type etc.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All groups were covered
## Annexes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Means of verification</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>End of campaign target</th>
<th>Final result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Representation and engagement of different size organisations in the campaign</td>
<td>Working group email lists Assembly attendance lists</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>50%-+ small member orgs have a rep on a Working group 75%-+ small member orgs attend more than half of assemblies</td>
<td>19% of small member organisations have a representative in a Working group. 32% of small members have attended at least one London/national assembly.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representation of different nations (England [including London and non-London], N. Ireland, Scotland, Wales)</td>
<td>Coalition Records</td>
<td>All regions covered</td>
<td>All regions were covered</td>
<td>All regions were covered. 76% of the coalition is based in England. 7% based in Scotland, 8% in NI and 8% in Wales</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthened campaigning/public support ability of member organisations</td>
<td>No. of members reporting an increase in capacity to campaign</td>
<td>Survey</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Min 50% report increased</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of organisations who are campaigning for the first time in IF</td>
<td>Survey</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>As many as possible</td>
<td>At least 20 organisations were campaigning for the first time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of organisations who are coalition campaigning for the first time in IF</td>
<td>Survey</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>As many as possible</td>
<td>At least 12 organisations were campaigning in a coalition for the first time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of members reporting an appetite for future campaigning and coalition campaigning</td>
<td>Survey</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100% of those not new to campaigning 50%-+ for those campaigning for the first time</td>
<td>87% of those not new to campaigning and 80% of those campaigning for the first time stated that they were likely to continue campaigning beyond IF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Annex 3: IF campaign monitoring log

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
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<th>End of campaign target</th>
<th>Final result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK civil society campaigning platform strengthened (and working together continues)</td>
<td>No. of members reporting a) an appetite for continued working together b) plans to do so c) already doing so and d) the opportunity to do so</td>
<td>Survey</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>70% with an appetite to continue joint working</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**6. Global support for campaign aims achieved**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Involvement of non-UK national and international NGOs and networks</th>
<th>No. of target countries holding an IF event on the Global Day of Action</th>
<th>Campaign records</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>10 key countries + some developing countries</th>
<th>Activity in 18 countries, including 8 of the 10 key countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Southern participation in the campaign</td>
<td>No. of southern voices present at IF events</td>
<td>Coalition records and final evaluation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Not defined</td>
<td>Data not available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Annex 4: Informal Policy Assessment (in relation to the G8 period of the campaign)
**By Chair of the Policy and Advocacy Working Group**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Gold</th>
<th>Silver</th>
<th>Bronze</th>
<th>What we got</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nutrition</td>
<td>US$1 billion 2015-2020 from donors; (same for the UK) Brazil hosts 2016 pledging Summit</td>
<td>US$1 billion by 2019 (same for the UK) Brazil hosts 2016 Summit</td>
<td>Anything between US$500 million to US$1 billion by 2019 (same for the UK)</td>
<td>GOLD for the UK, EU GOLD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land</td>
<td>Land Transparency Initiative (LTI) agreed Partnerships formed G8 puts own house in order</td>
<td>Process for LTI Partnerships agreed Ambition to put house in order</td>
<td>Partnerships agreed</td>
<td>BRONZE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax</td>
<td>registries</td>
<td>registries</td>
<td>registries</td>
<td>Public</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The evaluators remain particularly keen to emphasise the “tool for internal learning” aspect of this evaluation. It aims to build on ongoing discussions with members of the IF Coalition around the building of strategic and operational capacity for future campaigning and advocacy work that the UK international NGO sector collectively undertakes.

2 See Annex 2.
3 Steve Tibbett, October 2013, IF campaign Coalition Formation Evaluation (internal document).
4 One internal was a member of two categories.
5 These were set against the parameters set down by the campaign measures of success, captured by the IF campaign coalition members and centrally by Bond and coordinated overall by Bond, under the auspices of the MEUOC Committee.
6 See theadvocacyhub.org
7 Due mainly to diary constraints.
8 This is adapted from an internal IF document.
10 The reasons for this were assessed further in the Formation Evaluation.
11 Internal IF document.
12 The purpose of the OC was described in the strategy as: “To steer the campaign through to success and be responsible to the Board for the strategy and all operational activities and decisions.”
13 The purpose of the Board was described in the strategy as: “To agree the highest level strategy and direction of the campaign”.
14 The purpose of the assembly meetings was described in the strategy as: “To engage with wider membership in discussions around campaign direction and strategy”.
15 See, for instance, Alex Glennie, Will Straw and Leni Wild, June 2012, “Understanding public attitudes to aid and development” and Bond’s recent work on public support for development: http://www.bond.org.uk/advocacy/public-support
17 See, for instance, Duncan Geece, 23 June 2011, “Clicktivism’s assault on dictators, politics and NGOs”, Wired.co.uk
18 See, for instance, Jim Coe, 2013, “Painted Ships, on the move” http://www.coeandkingham.org.uk/author/jim
19 http://findingframes.org/finding%20frames%20Bond%20Report%202011%20Executive%20Summary%20DRAFT.pdf
20 Internal IF document
21 Internal IF document
23 An international organisation seeking strong commitments from governments to promote transparency, increase civic participation, fight corruption, and harness new technologies to make government more open, effective, and accountable.
24 Internal IF document.
25 Internal IF document.
26 Internal IF document
28 See, for instance, Larry Elliot, 18 June 2013, “G8 summit: tax campaigners condemn David Cameron’s 10-point ‘wish list’”.
29 Owen Barder and Alex Cobham, June 19, 2013, “How did the G-8 do on financial secrecy and tax?”, www.owen.org
30 Richard Murphy, 2013, “Why the Lough Erne G8 was a turning point – An academic’s perspective” http://www.taxresearch.org.uk
FOOTNOTES

32 There was discussion in the OC and PAG in the run to the budget over the degree to which the aid commitment was tangibly at risk.
33 Nutrition for Growth, undated, “Nutrition for Growth Commitments: Executive Summary”, Gov.uk website
35 Here ‘attribution’ refers to the ways in which changes in policy and practice were wholly driven by the campaign while contribution refers to the extent that the campaign contributed to changes in policy and practice.
36 Internal IF document
37 The ‘Coalition Formation’ report outlines early discussions around the original intention of some of the campaign’s instigators to reframe the hunger narrative and push the sector further towards a set of recommendations in: Andrew Darnton with Martin Kirk January, 2011, “Finding Frames: New ways to engage the UK public in global poverty”, Bond, Oxfam, DFID.
38 The research is not collected in one report, but rather in a series of PowerPoint presentations.
39 Tracker panel - IF campaign in-house research in association with Research Now.
40 Numbers from the Supporters Survey, Internal IF document.
41 IF campaign, October 2013, “Supporter Data, October Update”
42 Indeed this seems to be emergent in the next phase of the IF campaign as a legacy.
45 There was a comprehensive internal evaluation of the Scottish arm of the IF campaign.
48 The evaluation scope did not include interviews with Scottish government representatives.
50 ntpSynergy Charty Parliamentary Monitor, April/May 2013
51 For instance in the Measures of Success: “3. Increased media coverage of structural causes of hunger, malnutrition and environmental degradation”
52 Internal IF document
53 Internal IF document
54 Internal IF document
56 See: The University of Manchester, 9 November 2011, Research shows declining power of celebrity backing for good causes”, Press Release on research by Dr Daniel Brockington.
57 An organogram of the main structure of the coalition is provided in Annex 1.
58 Internal IF document
59 The Agile Sign Off Group was a small group of OC representatives responsible for signing off uncontroversial or urgent pieces of work.
60 http://enoughtoodif.org/g8/northern-ireland
62 From analysis in the Formation report.
63 See Annex 3.
64 For more information on campaign costs please see the IF website: http://enoughtoodif.org/about-campaign/if-campaign-how-it-happened
65 These recommendations and lessons harvested from the Formation Evaluation are relevant to the overall recommendations here.
66 This is table adapted from the IF Monitoring Log