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A Marriage of D's and R's?Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes are now a standard response to situations of post conflict or following an agreement that will result in an opportunity for peace. This article looks at the R in DDR, asking if it is really joined to and receiving as much attention as the D's. It places this analysis in the context of donor and policy coherence. Picciotto et al[1] provide an excellent framework for conceptualising policy coherence, suggesting it has four interrelated dimensions. The first refers to the internal consistency of the aid programmes; the second they call ‘whole of government coherence’ (joined up policy making across departments); thirdly 'harmonisation' (joined up policy making across donor countries); and finally 'alignment', referring to the connection between donor policy and strategic practices in the country concerned. All of these points, in particular the final one, become especially problematic when dealing with fragile states. Given that countries which engage in Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) initiatives are recent or current conflict zones there may be local buy in, or not, and local capacity to deliver, or not. Such 'difficult environments' are defined by Torres and Anderson [2] as " [where].. the state is unable or unwilling to harness domestic and international resources effectively for poverty reduction." This might reasonably include the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Congo, Afghanistan and Sierra Leone, all countries which have experienced DDR programming. DDR programmes seek to create a safe(er) environment, to enable people to earn enough for a (more) secure livelihood and, critically, to (re) integrate ex military personnel into communities. [3] In the longer run they should lead to the sustained social and economic reintegration of former fighters into a peaceful and secure society. Effective DDR is always going to be problematic. Government capacity is one area, programme coherence, security, gender and cost considerations all exacerbate the difficulties for donors, governments and implementers. Part of the problem is in joining up two quite different areas of activity; the first a military process with a concrete result, the second a development process the success of which may be hard to measure but ultimately defines the success of the whole programme. Hitchcock argues that the lead institution for the whole DDR process should be a civilian one ‘that is neutral, specialised and administratively competent’ Usually, however, this has not been the case. In Angola the government played the role of facilitator, in Afghanistan the UN (UNAMA), the government, the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) and other actors are involved at different stages[4]. There is no policy coherence. For the ‘Reintegration’ to be effective, a large-scale developmental type response is required, inevitably involving situations outside the control of the DDR programme. It is recognition of this complexity which has introduced an additional ‘R’ into the mix; the horribly named 'Reinsertion' ‘DD(R)R’. This is a period of ‘short term financial/material assistance to meet immediate problems’ [5] and one of the few occasions where donors are prepared to countenance cash payments rather than delivering food or projects. [6] Another coherence problem concerns two security issues, disarming civilians and the availability of arms or other conflict in the region [7]. These are both likely to impact negatively on a local DD(R)R programme. In many circumstances, the DRC for example, local civilians may have as many arms as militias. And few are going to be willing to really disarm if rival groups maintain their weapons [8]. With problems over ’Disarmament’, ‘Reintegration’ is likely to be less effective. Gender roles, too, need closely examining. Male and female excombatants may need the R in different forms. What of wives of ex combatants [9], of the possibility of making women even more dependent on their partners during the reinsertion and reintegration phase [10], or the inappropriate delivery of training [11]? A number of activities can further disempower women. Whatever the number of ‘Rs’, they need more attention. They may be at the last stage of a process, but they are an integral part of the whole. Without some form of integration, both in terms of cultural understanding and economic wellbeing, there is a significant likelihood that demobilised soldiers will either become thugs or rejoin armies or militias [12]. It may also be that successful development needs to precede DDR programmes to realise an enabling environment for DDR. Rehabilitation programmes are long term processes. To evaluate success, monitoring and evaluation are necessary for a period after the 'completion' of the programme. Who will pay for this? There is so far little evidence that DDR is really a ‘key step in the process of moving from conflict to sustainable development’[13]. Successful reintegration is a complex social, economic and military challenge; we have a way to go before fully understanding it. Graham Wood is Head of Policy, Ockenden International. He has 20
years experience working in the humanitarian and development world, mainly
in Africa and the Middle East. He is also a Board member of the Aid Workers
Network (AWN). References:
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